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EN/GENDERING EQUALITY: SEEKING RELIEF UNDER
TITLE VII AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
ANTHONY E. VARONA AND JEFFREY M. MONKS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Discrimination against lesbians and gay men often is
motivated more by how we violate societal sex and gender norms
than it is by the much narrower characteristic of specifically
how, and with whom, we have sex. Same-sex sexual expression
is just one facet of lesbian and gay identity and expression,
which themselves are elements of our gender identity and
expression. Although it is widely understood that the gender
identity and expression of transgendered people (i.e.,
transsexuals or intersexuals) are what precipitate discrimination
against them, it is also true that the gender identity and
expression of lesbians, gay men and bisexuals cause much of the
discrimination we face.
That sexual orientation is interwoven with gender identity
and expression is manifested quite clearly in common instances
of anti-gay discrimination and harassment. Many gay boys, long
before engaging in same-sex sexual activity, share the experience
of being taunted and teased for "acting queer" or "looking like a
faggot" simply because they are not as aggressive or masculine-
appearing as other boys. These boys are not harassed because of
the sex of their intimate partner, of course, but because of how
they express their gender. More specifically, they are harassed
and bullied because of their failure to conform to the gender
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norms assigned to their sex (i.e., their degree of masculinity if
they are male or femininity if they are female).'
The Stonewall Rebellion, the mid-summer 1969 riots
sparked by police harassment of the Greenwich Village, New
York City gay bar named the Stonewall Inn, marked the birth of
the modern lesbian and gay civil rights movement and mobilized
generations of gay people to join the struggle for equality.2
Media and eyewitness accounts of the Stonewall Inn police raid,
however, reveal that what motivated the police harassment was
not that the patrons slept with people of the same sex, but that
they were gender nonconforming men.3
The New York Daily News described the Stonewall Inn as "a
mecca for the homosexual element in the village" where gay men
could "drink, dance and do whatever little girls do when they get
together."4  Ridiculing the effeminate men and drag queens
among the patrons, the Daily News wrote that "[aill hell broke
loose when the police entered the Stonewall. The girls
instinctively reached for each other .... Queens, princesses and
ladies-in-waiting began hurling anything they could get their
polished, manicured fingernails on.... The war was on. The
lilies of the valley had become carnivorous jungle plants."5
Much anti-gay employment discrimination takes the form of
gender nonconformity discrimination. As detailed below, many
gay people face disparate treatment and harassment on the job
solely because their demeanor is not what some employers or co-
workers would consider appropriate to gender norms.6 A recent
example is the case of Redden v. Contimortgage Corp.,? in which
co-workers subjected a male employee to anti-gay harassment
even though he never identified himself as being gay.8 Co-
1. See Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1093 (D.
Minn. 2000) (holding that long-term harassment of tenth-grade male because of his
perceived sexual orientation and gender non-conformity, which included taunts of
"faggot," "gay boy," "queer," and "femme boy" and repeated physical threats and assaults,
created a claim for sex discrimination under Title IX)
2. See JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970, at 231-33 (2d ed. 1998)
(describing the Stonewall Rebellion and the emergence of a gay community mobilized
toward civil rights and equality).
3. See infra Part II.B.2.
4. Jerry Lisker, Homo Nest Raided, Queen Bees Are Stinging Mad, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, July 6, 1969, reprinted in William B. Rubenstein, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 66 (2d ed. 1997).
5. Id. at 66-67.
6. See infra Part II.B.3.
7. No. 99-4535, 1999 WL 1257280 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1999).
8. Id. at *1.
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workers concluded that Redden "must be a fag" because he wore
jewelry and had an effeminate voice.9
Even our culture's most absurd instances of heterosexism
evidence the conflation of sexual orientation with gender
identity. Jerry Falwell "outed" Tinky Winky Teletubby, the
fictional children's character, as gay simply because his gender
identity did not conform to his sex.i0 As evidence for his
assertion, Falwell noted that Tinky Winky dresses in lavender,
wears a hat in the shape of a triangle and carries a red purse.11
Because much sexual orientation employment
discrimination takes the form of discrimination based on gender
identity and expression, this Article examines the current
prospects for relying on the sex discrimination prohibition in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196412 in combating sexual
orientation discrimination in the workplace. Part II provides a
background for understanding current judicial interpretations of
Title VII's prohibition on workplace discrimination "because of
sex."13 First, we examine the language and legislative history
surrounding the inclusion of "sex" as a protected category under
Title VII. We then summarize how court interpretations of
"because of sex" have evolved since Title VII's passage to include
not only traditional disparate treatment claims by women, but
also claims by men, sexual harassment claims (first opposite-sex
and then same-sex), and sex stereotyping.
Part III details why Title VII should be interpreted as also
prohibiting anti-gay workplace discrimination, and analyzes the
courts' misinterpretation of the difference between "sex" and
"gender." Part IV then determines the current feasibility of using
Title VII as a tool to combat anti-gay workplace discrimination
by looking at how courts across the country have interpreted
"because of sex" in cases involving parties who were either gay or
perceived to be gay. This part details how the current state of
Title VII is generally hostile to expanding the interpretation of
the statute to cover sexual orientation, but that gay employment
discrimination victims should continue to bring test cases under
Title VII. Finally, part V discusses why regardless of the success
of gay plaintiffs under Title VII, enacting the federal
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which would explicitly
9. Id.
10. See David Reed, Falwell Warns Readers That Teletubby Is Gay, NEW ORLEANS
TMIES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 10, 1999, at 13A, 1999 WL 4393574.
11. See id.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
13. Id.
2000]
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prohibit sexual orientation employment discrimination, is
essential for achieving equality and workplace fairness for
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered Americans.
II. HISTORY OF TITLE VII'S PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATION
"BECAUSE OF SEX"
A. Language and Legislative History of Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states: "It shall be
an unlawful employment practice . . . for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual.., because of... race, color,
religion, sex or national origin."14 The enacted version of the law
is very similar to the bill that was reported out of committee in
November 1963.15 There is, however, one significant difference-
the original bill did not include a ban on sex discrimination. 16
The peculiar and ironic legislative history (or rather lack
thereof) behind the inclusion of "sex" as one of the protected
categories in Title VII is now a fixture in congressional lore. For
almost all of its life as a bill, Title VII only covered race, religion
and national origin and in no way included "sex" within its
scope." It was not until one day before the Act's passage that
Virginia Representative Howard Smith offered an amendment to
the bill that would add "sex" as a protected category. 18 Smith's
objective was to incorporate a "poison pill" amendment into the
bill that would prevent passage of the Civil Rights Act in its
entirety.19 This strategy proved unsuccessful. After very little
debate,20 the amendment was approved, and the House of
14. Id.
15. Robert Stevens Miller, Jr., Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 880 (1967).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 883 n.34; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989)
(explaining that courts could not examine legislative intent, as the addition of "sex" was
intended to block the bill's passage); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th
Cir. 1984) (same); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (same);
Rasmusson v. Copeland Lumber Yards, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (D. Nev. 1997)
(same); Stephen S. Locke, The Equal Opportunity Harasser as a Paradigm for
Recognizing Sexual Harassment of Homosexuals Under Title VII, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 383,
385-86 (1996) (same). Apparently, Smith believed that congressional support for an anti-
workplace discrimination statute that included women would be weaker than for one
without, and so the Act would fail to pass if 'sex" was added. Miller, supra note 15, at
883. How and whether this fact should affect interpretation of Title VII is discussed
infra Part IV.A.1.
20. Miller, supra note 15, at 882.
2000] EN/GENDERING EQUALITY
Representatives passed the Civil Rights Act the next day by a
vote of 168 to 133.21
The bill was then sent to the Senate. Although the Senate
debated the bill for several months, there was very little
discussion over the addition of "sex" to Title VII or what its
ramifications might be.22
In sum, there is very little in the legislative history of Title
VII to illuminate what exactly Congress intended to include in
its prohibition of workplace discrimination "because of sex." The
history that does exist generally fails to enlighten.23 Nor is there
any clarifying language in the statute itself.24  Although
Congress amended the Civil Rights Act in 1972 and 1991,25 these
amendments have not clarified the meaning or intent behind the
inclusion of "sex" in Title VII.26 With little guidance from
Congress, federal courts have been forced to develop their own
doctrines in order to determine the scope of Title VII's
prohibition on sex discrimination.27
Rarely do courts reach a meaningful consensus on the key
elements of the statute. In general, however, Supreme Court
decisions follow a trend of allowing more types of sex
21. 110 CONG. REC. 2720 (1964). There was some opposition in the House, however,
to the inclusion of sex in the bill, including from Representatives who were generally
supportive of civil rights for both women and racial minorities. For example,
Representative Edith Green from Oregon, suspecting Smith's true motives, opposed the
amendment because she thought it would later "be used to help destroy this section of
the bill by some of the very people who today support it." Id. at 2581. In fact, it has been
observed that there were few members of the House who supported both the sex
amendment and the bill as a whole. Miller, supra note 15, at 883. It is likely, then, that
a sex discrimination statute, introduced as a separate bill, would not have been passed.
22. Miller, supra note'15, at 882-83.
23. One notable exception is the rejection by Congress to add the word "solely" to the
bill as a modifier for "sex." See 110 CONG. REC. 2728 (1964). Courts interpreted the
defeat of this amendment as congressional intent to allow a claim under Title VII even
when sex alone is not the motivating factor behind the discriminatory act. E.g., Barnes,
561 F.2d at 991. This is referred to as "sex-plus" discrimination and is discussed infra
Part II.B.3.
24. When Representative Smith proposed the sex amendment, he did not also
propose to statutorily define "sex." Instead, he merely inserted the word "sex" in each
place that the other protected categories were listed. Miller, supra note 15, at 882.
25. See Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102.166, Title I, §§ 105(a),
106, 107(a), 108, 105 Stat. 1074-76 (1991); Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-261, §§ 8-14, 86 Stat. 109, 109-113 (1972).
26. Some courts do look, however,to the 1972 amendments for guidance on legislative
intent. See, e.g., Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1256-57 (N.D. Ind.
1998). Most courts, however, including the Supreme Court, do not usually rely on these
amendments to clarify the intent of Congress regarding the meaning of "sex" in Title VII.
27. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-72 (1986) (explaining
standard used by courts in Title VII actions).
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discrimination claims rather than fewer. Lower federal courts
consistently follow these precedents.
B. Evolution of the Meaning of 'Because of Sex" in Title VII
1. Disparate Treatment
The most straightforward cause of action under Title VII is
disparate treatment. In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff
must simply show that he/she was subjected to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment that the other sex was not,
such as being denied a promotion or terminated.2"
When sex discrimination claims were first litigated under
Title VII, they were usually brought by women and involved
claims of disparate treatment. 29 Lower courts, however, also
recognized causes of action brought by men claiming
discrimination,3 0 even though it has often been observed that the
primary purpose of Title VII was to create equal employment for
women.31 The Supreme Court finally affirmed the view that
Title VII applied to sex discrimination against both men and
women in 1983, when it held in Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC32 that, under Title VII, "[miale as well as
female employees are protected against discrimination."33
28. See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
29. See, e.g., id. at 1198-99 (holding that imposing "no-marriage" rule for female but
not male flight attendants is impermissible disparate treatment under Title VII).
30. E.g., Rosen v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding
that a company pension plan that differentiated between men and women solely on the
basis of sex, causing male employees to receive reduced annuities, was unlawful); Diaz v.
Pan Am Worldways, Inc. 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) (ruling that the airline's
refusal to hire a male as a flight attendant violated the Civil Rights Act).
31. E.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987. During her time as a women's rights
litigator, bringing a number of prominent cases to the Supreme Court, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg often represented male plaintiffs, reasoning that laws based on
stereotypical assumptions concerning the sexes were damaging to both men and women
regardless of the sex of the plaintiff. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender
from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 9-10 (1995).
32. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
33. Id. at 682. Another cause of action that has developed under Title VII is one
involving disparate impact. The Court first recognized this cause of action in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court found that the requirement of passing
an intelligence test or completing high school as a condition of employment was
discriminatory where it causes a substantial number of blacks to be ineligible and is not
significantly related to job performance. Id. at 431. A disparate impact case is shown
where an employer's policy is neutral on its face, but it disproportionately burdens one
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2. Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment is another cause of action under Title
VII. In order to establish a prima facie case of sexual
harassment, a plaintiff must show that he/she (1) is a member of
a protected class, (2) received unwelcome sexual harassment, (3)
based on sex, (4) that affected a term or condition of
employment, and (5) the employer knew or should have known
about the harassment and did not take steps to correct it.3 4
Although sexual harassment claims brought under Title VII
are commonplace today, many federal district courts initially
dismissed these suits in the 1970s as being non-actionable. 35 The
central argument relied upon by courts denying sexual
harassment claims was generally that Congress' intent in
enacting Title VII was not to prohibit sexual harassment, but
rather "to make careers open to talents irrespective of race or
sex."36 Furthermore, it was argued that sexual harassment was
not "because of sex" within the meaning of Title VII because the
gender lines of harasser and victim could have been switched (or
not crossed at all) and, therefore, gender was "incidental" to the
claim.37
Higher courts soon reversed these narrow interpretations of
"because of sex."38 The Tomkins court reasoned that Title VII
was meant to invalidate all "'artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to the employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of.
impermissible classification [s]. ' '39 Furthermore, the harassment
was "because of sex" since the female plaintiffs would not have
been harassed if they had been men.40
protected group in relation to the other. See id. at 432. The development of disparate
impact litigation, however, will not be explored in this Article because it does not directly
concern the meaning of "because of sex."
34. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
35. E.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas. Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976),
rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (reinstating Title VII claim of sexual harassment as
actionable).
36. Id. at 556.
37. Id.
38. E.g., Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1044.
39. Id. at 1047 n.2 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971)).
40. Id. at 1047. It is interesting to note that courts in these cases did not require the
plaintiffs to produce any evidence that the harassment was "because of sex," but rather
assumed it due to the sexual nature of the abuse. Id.
20001
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Initially, courts limited sexual harassment protection under
Title VII to instances where submission to sexual demands was
made a condition of "tangible" employment benefits, or quid pro
quo harassment. 41 In 1986, however, following the lead of many
circuit courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson,42 held that Title VII also prohibited so-
called hostile work environments. 43 Rejecting the defendant's
argument that Congress only intended to protect employees from
"'tangible loss[es]' of 'an economic character,'" then-Justice
Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion, stated that the
language of Title VII "evinces a congressional "'intent to strike at
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women"
in employment."44  This means that if sexual harassment
becomes so "severe or pervasive" that it alters the terms or
conditions of employment, it is just as much an "'arbitrary
barrier to sexual equality at the workplace'" as is quid pro quo
harassment or disparate treatment. 5
Although all federal courts have recognized opposite-sex
sexual harassment claims for some time, until very recently
federal courts had taken "a bewildering variety of stances" on
the issue of whether same-sex harassment was actionable as sex
discrimination under Title VII. 46 While some circuits allowed
same-sex harassment claims,'7 others allowed them only if the
plaintiff could show that the harasser was homosexual, or that a
general anti-male animus existed in the workplace. 48 Still others
barred all same-sex harassment claims, regardless of the
circumstances. 49
Among courts that rejected or strictly limited same-sex
harassment claims, the justification most often relied upon was
again congressional intent. For instance, in the oft-cited case
Goluszek v. Smith,50 the Northern District of Illinois declared
41. E.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE LAW
231-35 (1989) (describing the development of sexual harassment law from the 1970s
through the 1980s).
42. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
43. Id. at 66-67.
44. Id. at 64 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 67 (citation omitted).
46. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
47. E.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1997).
48. E.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 446 (6th Cir. 1997);
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996).
49. E.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
50. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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that Congress never intended Title VII to encompass same-sex
harassment claims. 5' Citing a student written law review note,
the district court stated that "[tihe discrimination Congress was
concerned about when it enacted Title VII is one stemming from
an imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the
powerful which results in discrimination against a discrete and
vulnerable group."52 The court concluded that even though the
plaintiff "may have been harassed 'because' he is a male,"53 there
could be no Title VII claim because there could be no imbalance
of power between the sexes when the plaintiff worked in an all-
male environment.54
In 1998, the Supreme Court again rejected this narrow
interpretation of Title VII in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.55 In a unanimous opinion written by Justice
Scalia, the Court admitted that same-sex harassment was "not
the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted
Title VII."56 The Court argued, however, that statutes "often go
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed."57
Furthermore, since the Court had already recognized that racial
minorities can discriminate against members of their own
group, 58 there was no reason to assume that men and women
could not discriminate against their own sex as well.5 9 As long
as a plaintiff in a same-sex harassment case can show that
his/her harassment was "because of sex," he/she has an
actionable Title VII claim.0
51. See id. at 1456.
52. Id. (citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under
Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451-52 (1984)). Curiously, such a rationale would
actually support a finding that Title VII protects gender nonconforming individuals from
workplace discrimination since gender nonconformists are a "discrete and vulnerable
group" whose adverse treatment is often a result of an imbalance of power.
53. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1455.
54. Id.
55. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
56. Id. at 79.
57. Id.
58. E.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 500 (1977).
59. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78.
60. Of course, how to apply the "because of sex" standard was the central cause of
disagreement among the circuits, and Oncale sheds little light on this issue. While the
Supreme Court has now made clear that there is no absolute bar to same-sex
harassment claims, there is still significant disagreement within the circuits over which
same-sex harassment claims are valid, particularly in cases involving actual or perceived
gay plaintiffs. This issue is discussed in depth infra Part IV.C.
20001
76 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 7:67
3. Sex Stereotyping
Although not a cause of action per se, sex stereotyping is a
form of sex discrimination that can occur in the context of either
disparate treatment or sexual harassment.61 Sex discrimination
does not always take the form of an employer treating all
members of one gender adversely. Instead, sometimes an
employer will target for discrimination men or women who look
or act in a way that the employer believes is appropriate only for
members of the opposite sex, while treating equally individuals
who conform to the employer's view of traditional gender norms.
This practice is known as "sex stereotyping" and has been
recognized by the Supreme Court as a form of sex discrimination
under Title VII.62
Although the Supreme Court did not expressly recognize
that sex stereotyping was sex discrimination until 1989,6 the
beginnings of a sex stereotyping claim were recognized in the
early 1970s. The seed was planted by the Supreme Court in
1971 in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,64 when it first
recognized "sex-plus" discrimination as being actionable under
Title VII.65 In that case, the Court held that a company policy
not to accept applications from women with pre-school age
61. Because Title VII requires that an employee be subjected to adverse employment
action before he/she can prevail on a discrimination claim, see, for example, Dobbs-
Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 544 (6th Cir 1999), the fact that an employer
holds sex stereotyping views is not enough to create a cause of action under Title VII.
Rather, sex stereotyping becomes sex discrimination when an employer harasses or
treats an employee unequally because he/she fails to conform to gender stereotypes. See,
e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (recognizing disparate treat-
ment claim based on sex stereotyping theory); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580
(7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing sexual harassment claim based on sex stereotyping theory).62. E.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989). For a discussion
of this case, see infra pp. 79-80.
63. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 250-51.
64. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
65. Id. at 544. Sex-plus discrimination occurs any time an individual is
discriminated against because of her sex in conjunction with another characteristic. Id.;
see also Marks v. Nat'l Communications Ass'n, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 322, 329 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (explaining that discrimination based solely on weight does not violate civil rights
as long as it is not intertwined with the issue of sex). Common types of sex-plus
discrimination include discrimination against individuals of one sex who are married,
pregnant, or overweight. E.g., Phillips, 400 U.S. at 545 (refusing to hire a woman with
young children impermissible); Frank v. United Airlines, Inc. 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir.
2000) (dismissing female flight attendants whose weight is above that of an average
small framed woman, and not dismissing men with weight above that of an average
small framed man impermissible);.Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1197
(7th Cir. 1971) (prohibiting female flight attendants from marrying impermissible). Sex
stereotyping is one form of sex-plus discrimination in that it is discrimination based on
sex 'plus' one or more gender nonconforming characteristics.
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children-when it accepted applications from men with pre-
school age children-constituted sex discrimination.6  The
district court had found that seventy-five to eighty percent of
those hired for similar positions were women,67 thus showing
that the defendant did not discriminate against women in
general.6 The Court nevertheless held that an employer could
not have different hiring policies for men and women.69 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Marshall emphasized that such a
distinction was unlawful because it was "based on stereotyped
characterizations of the sexes."70
The Seventh Circuit, in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.,71
articulated more fully the reasoning underlying the Phillips
decision. In striking down a company policy that prohibited
female flight attendants from being married, the court noted:
"The scope of [Title VII] is not confined to explicit
discriminations based 'solely' on sex. In forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." 72 The
Supreme Court affirmed this principle a few years later in City
of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart," when
it stated that "[i]t is now well recognized that employment
decisions cannot be predicated on mere 'stereotyped' impressions
about the characteristics of males or females."74
Although explicit recognition of sex stereotyping claims
would be a logical continuation of these precedents, some federal
appellate courts insisted on reading Title VII narrowly and
denied the claims of plaintiffs who were discriminated against
for gender nonconformity. For example, in the case of Smith v.
66. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 545. The Court qualified this holding by stating that such
discrimination would be lawful if the distinction could be justified as a "bona fide
occupational qualification." Id. at 544. Under Title VII, being a particular sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification when it is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994).
67. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
71. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
72. Id. at 1198; see also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("It is
clear that the statutory embargo on sex discrimination in employment is not confined to
differentials founded wholly upon an employee's gender.").
73. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
74. Id. at 707. In Manhart, the defendant had a pension plan that charged higher
monthly payments for female employees than males because mortality tables showed
that women lived longer than men. Id. at 702. The Court held that the pension plan was
discrimination "because of sex." Id. at 712.
.20001
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Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 75 the Fifth Circuit held that Title
VII did not protect men who exhibited traditionally feminine
characteristics from employment discrimination. 76 Bennie Smith
was denied a job as a mail room clerk because his interviewer
believed him to be "effeminate."77
Referring to the lack of a "stronger Congressional mandate,"
the court argued that the plaintiff was not "discriminated
against because he was a male, but because as a male, he was
thought to have those attributes more generally characteristic of
females."78  Disregarding precedent dealing with sex-plus
discrimination, the Fifth Circuit in essence held that because
only a subset of males, rather than men in general, were subject
to adverse treatment, Title VII did not apply.
79
75. 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
76. See id. at 327. The Ninth Circuit came to a similar conclusion when it held that
Title VII did not prohibit a school from firing a male teacher because he wore an earring.
DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331-32 (9th Cir. 1979).
77. Smith, 569 F.2d at 326.
78. Id. at 327.
79. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that Title VII did not prohibit employers from
imposing hair length requirements for male employees when it did not impose such
requirements on women. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pubrg Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th
Cir. 1975) (en banc). A panel of the court of appeals had held that such a policy "treats
applicants differently because of a sex stereotype." See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pubrg
Co., 482 F.2d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 1973). In reversing the panel decision, the Fifth Circuit
justified its holding by stating that Congress never intended Title VII to have "sweeping
implications" and, therefore, should not apply to hair length, which is not an "immutable
... characteristic." Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1090, 1092. Although the EEOC initially
took the position that differing hair length requirements were sex discrimination, all
federal appellate courts that have ruled on the lawfulness of hair length requirements for
men have agreed with the Fifth Circuit in holding that they do not violate Title VII.
Accord, Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding
grooming requirements such as wearing a tie may be applied to only men without
violating Title VII); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding
hair length requirements that are shorter for men than for women do not violate Title
VII); Earwood Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (same);
Knott v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1975) (same); Dodge v. Giant
Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (same). Although most of these decisions
were written in the 1970s, the more recent cases have come to the same conclusion. E.g.,
Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding hair
length requirements that are shorter for men than for women do not violate Title VII);
Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch.,. 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (same).
In contrast, some courts have held that having a different dress code for men and
women is a Title VII violation, at least in some circumstances. See Carroll v. Talman 604
F.2d 1028, 1030 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that the policy requiring women but not men to
wear uniforms violates Title VII). In general, a court's determination of whether a
particular "grooming code" is discrimination under Title VII turns on whether the court
believes the requirement imposes a heavier 'burden" on one sex. See Frank v. United
Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000). Therefore, a dress code that, for
example, required men to wear ties and women to wear skirts would not necessarily be
held to violate Title VII. See, e.g., Fountain, 555 F.2d at 756.
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In 1989, the Supreme Court expressly declared that sex
stereotyping was sex discrimination under Title VII in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.80 The plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, Ann
Hopkins, had been recommended for partnership in the firm, but
was ultimately denied promotion even though her record in
securing major contracts was better than all of the other
partnership candidates.8 ' Hopkins alleged that she had been a
victim of sex stereotyping."2 In support of this allegation,
Hopkins presented evidence that other Price Waterhouse
partners had stated that she was "macho" and should take "a
course at charm school."8 3 They objected to Hopkins "using foul
language" because she was a "lady."8 4 Most important was the
advice that Hopkins's employer gave her in order to improve her
chances in obtaining a partnership. Hopkins was told by her
employer to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry" to improve her chances of promotion.8 5
The Supreme Court held that her employer's conduct was
unlawful sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.8 6 In an
opinion by Justice Brennan,8 7  the Court first discussed
The implications of both hair length and dress code requirements are obvious for
gender nonconforming employees, particularly among those that are transgendered.
Most courts have taken the position that differing grooming standards do not constitute
sex discrimination because they have 'only a negligible effect on employment
opportunities." E.g., Knott, 527 F.2d at 1252. A strong argument could be made that
these holdings contradict Supreme Court holdings that Title VII is meant to strike at all
disparate treatment between men and women and that sex stereotyping is impermissible
under Title VII. The Supreme Court, however, has yet to decide a case on grooming
codes under Title VII.
80. 490 U.S. 228, 249-51 (1989). One commentator has argued that because sex
stereotyping 'is triggered by the fact that the victim has somehow transgressed the
boundaries of... culturally-constructed stereotypes about what it means to be a man or
a woman in our society[,] .. . it is ... the ultimate kind of sex discrimination." Toni
Lester, Protecting the Gender Nonconformist from the Gender Police-Why the
Harassment of Gays and Other Gender Nonconformists Is a Form of Sex Discrimination
in Light of the Supreme Court's Decision in Oncale v. Sundowner, 29 N.M. L. REV. 89,
103 (1999).
81. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 235.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 258.
87. Id. at 228. Brennan wrote for a plurality of four justices. There were two
concurring justices and three dissenters who disagreed with the Court's central holding
involving burden shifting. However, neither of the two concurring justices took issue
with any of the principles regarding the legal relevance of sex stereotyping.
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legislative intent, interpreting it broadly and noting that Title
VII was meant "to drive employers to focus on qualifications
rather than on race, religion, sex or national origin."88 The Court
then addressed the argument that sex stereotyping was not
discrimination "because of sex:"
[Ain employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on
the basis of gender .... [We are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting
that they match []the stereotypes associated with their
group.
89
According to the Price Waterhouse Court, if an employer
discriminates against a member of one gender for exhibiting a
particular characteristic (such as aggressiveness) that it would
find acceptable in the other gender, that employer has
discriminated "because of sex."90 Simply put, the Court held that
Title VII prohibits discrimination against individuals who fail to
conform to gender stereotypes.91
The Supreme Court has yet to revisit the issue of gender
stereotyping,92 but since Price Waterhouse, lower federal courts
have consistently recognized that, at least in cases with very
similar facts, sex stereotyping is an impermissible basis for
discrimination under Title VII.93
88. Id. at 243.
89. Id. at 250-51.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. It should be noted that the central holding of Price Waterhouse involved issues
regarding burden shifting and whether an employer can still be held liable under Title
VII if it can show that it would have made the same decision in the absence of an
unlawful motive. On this issue, the Court held that an employer could avoid liability if it
could make this showing. Id. at 242-43. In 1991, Congress superseded this holding by
amending the Civil Rights Act to provide that once a plaintiff proves that discrimination
based on a protected category was at least one motivating factor in the decision, liability
is established. See Borgo v. Goldin, 204 F.3d 251, 255 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (establishing
such liability). The Court's statements regarding gender stereotyping as sex
discrimination, however, were unaffected by the amendments and are still viable. See
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 n.3 (1st Cir. 1999).
93. See, e.g., Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2000); Lindahl v.
Air Fr., 930 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1991). In Lindahl, the female plaintiff was passed
over for a promotion after she was told by her supervisor that she was the most qualified
for the job. Lindahl, 930 F.2d at 1436. The plaintiffs supervisor stated the reason for
the pass-over was that the plaintiff got "nervous" and would get "easily upset and lose
control." Id. at 1439. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's granting of
summary judgment for the defendant, holding that an employer may not base its
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III. WHY ANTI-GAY DISCRIMINATION IS "BECAUSE OF SEX"
UNDER TITLE VII.
A. Homophobia as a Form of Sexism
The argument that discrimination against gay people is the
alter ego of sex discrimination is by no means a new one. A
number of scholars already have asserted that
homophobia/heterosexism is simply another manifestation of
misogyny and patriarchal gender norms. 94
It is without doubt that polar and uneven male/female
gender roles in our society are pervasive and deep. From the
moment a baby is born and his/her sex is identified and
announced (e.g. "It's a Girl!"), he/she is assigned a gender and a
correlating set of gender role expectations. Traditionally, dolls
and domestic work toys (play ovens and kitchen sets) are
assigned to girls. Action figures, building blocks and toy vehicles
for boys. Girls are dressed in pretty dresses, while boys are
garbed in activewear.
The importance of maintaining physical attractiveness (for
the benefit of boys) is emphasized to girls, while boys
traditionally are taught to lead, compete, and create for their
own benefit. Athleticism, intellectual achievement and sexual
conquest are traditionally valued in boys. Nurturing, mothering,
domestic skills, and physical attractiveness are valued in girls.
promotion decisions on "stereotypical images of men and women, specifically that women
do not make good leaders because they are too 'emotional.' Id.
In Bellaver, the female plaintiff had consistently scored in the high or highest
ranges on her annual evaluations, but was terminated anyway because she was too
"aggressive." Bellaver, 200 F.3d at 488. The Seventh Circuit held that an employer may
not require an employee to have interpersonal skills that "match stereotyped, unequal
ideas about how men and women should behave." Id. at 492. Since there was evidence
that male employees with similar interpersonal skills were tolerated, there was an issue
of fact over whether the defendant had discriminated against the plaintiff "because of
sex." See id.
94. See Case, supra note 31, at 57-61; Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination
Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 199-202
(1994); Lester, supra note 80, at 89; Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of
Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 24
(1992); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the
Conflation of 'Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and
Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 205-07 (1995); I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation)
and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1159 (1991).
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As just one example, a popular retail catalog offers two
variations of a children's "bed tent," which is an enclosed bed
canopy intended to turn a child's bed into a playspace.9 5
Presumably, one is designed for boys and another for girls. The
blue and grey one featuring the young boy model is designed to
appear like a space shuttle. The one for girls, which features a
girl model, is shaped like a little pink house. The gender
expectations could not be clearer or more disparate.
Gay men often are discriminated against because our
rejection of the traditional male gender role (i.e., rejection of the
domination of women in opposite-sex relationships) undermines
male supremacy. We are discriminated against not solely
because of how and with whom we have sex, but because of what
that sex represents.
Traditionally, a man's power and authority emanate from
his sexual dominion over women. To many in society, a man
cannot retain these privileges if his love interest is another man.
Moreover, to many putatively heterosexual men, the submission
of one man unto another man for sexual intimacy is always a
violation of male gender norms regardless of. the particular
mechanics of the encounter (i.e., whether the man in question is
a receptive or insertive partner). 6
It has been argued that gay men are discriminated against
because, to varying degrees, they have taken on qualities and
behaviors traditionally reserved for women.97 Some may view
gay men as having degraded themselves by assuming a female
role in sex, or simply by refusing the traditional male role of
dominating women.9 8  Because all things associated with
femininity have traditionally been de-valued, gay men are
95. Lilly's Kids, SKYMALL CATALOG, Summer 2000, at 146 (on file with author).
96. See, e.g., Case, supra note 31, at 14. According to Professor Case, "for much of
Western history an important axis of sexual orientation was... that of active/passive or
penetrative/receptive. With this as the axis, women together with males who allowed
themselves to be penetrated orally or anally were opposed and seen as subordinate to
'active' penetrative males." Id. at 14.
97. Id. at 61 n.205 (describing the plaintiff in Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452
(N.D. Ill. 1988), as a victim of gender stereotype, tormented by his co-workers for his
feminine characteristics and traits).
98. Kara L. Gross, Note, Toward Gender Equality and Understanding: Recognizing
That Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Is Sex Discrimination, 62 BROOK L. REV. 1165, 1208
n.223 (1996). In certain cultures, including Anglo-American society, the extent to which
a gay man is perceived as masculine or effeminate depends on whether he is (or at least
advertises himself) as an active or penetrating male, or a passive or receiving male. See
EVA CANTARELLA, BISEXUALITY IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 112-13, 175-81 (Carmac 0.
Cuilleanain trans., Yale Univ. Press 1992) (1988); GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK:
THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE WORLD, 1890-1940, at 81, 84-85 (Flamingo ed., 1995)
(1994); Valdes, supra note 94, at 56-71.
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likewise viewed as inferior. Gay men threaten the patriarchal
stronghold because, by declining to participate in the sexual
subordination of women and by adopting traditionally feminine
characteristics, we blur the gender distinctions upon which male
dominance is dependent.
On the other hand, some lesbians threaten to de-polarize the
concept of gender by refusing to assume the traditionally passive
and subservient feminine norm in favor of a more independent
and assertive (i.e., traditionally masculine) affect. Much of
society's opprobrium toward lesbians is rooted in a resistance to
the idea that women do not have to be dependent on men to
succeed and prosper, in their sexuality as well as in other
aspects of their lives. Same-sex attraction to women becomes a
form of "'insubordination'" in that "'it denies that female
sexuality exists or should exist, only for the sake of male
gratification.'"9
For both gay men and lesbians, the motivation behind the
suppression is preservation of the gender dichotomy upon which
female subordination rests.100  Since animus against
homosexuals is based on a desire to preserve gender polarities
and to subordinate women, acts that discriminate against gays
should be viewed as sex discrimination as well.101
B. Anti-Gay Workplace Discrimination as a Form of Sex
Stereotyping
1. All Anti-Gay Discrimination Is Based on Sex
Stereotyping
The argument that discrimination against gays is really sex
discrimination works not only on a theoretical level, but also
should be recognized within the context of Title VII as a form of
99. Gross, supra note 98, at 1208 n.223 (citation omitted). Gross also compares anti-
gay discrimination to prohibitions on miscegenation. She argues that just as laws
against interracial marriages served the purpose of maintaining white supremacy by
preserving the black-white distinction, so does condemnation of homosexuality maintain
male supremacy by preserving the distinctions between men and women. Id. at 1210.
100. See Rachel L. Toker, Multiple Masculinities: A New Vision for Same-Sex
Harassment Law, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 577, 593 (1999).
101. See Case, supra note 31, at 47 ("If women were protected for being masculine but
men could be penalized for being effeminate, this would . . . send a strong message of
subordination to women, because it would mean that feminine qualities, which women
are disproportionately likely to display, may legitimately be devalued although
masculine qualities may not.").
20001
84 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 7:67
sex stereotyping. As discussed above, the Supreme Court in
Price Waterhouse recognized that sex stereotyping is sex
discrimination under Title VII. 102 Any time employers "evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they match the
stereotype associated with their group," they have discriminated
"because of sex" under the meaning of Title VII.103 Although the
plaintiff in Price Waterhouse was female, the Court wrote the
opinion in gender-neutral language; therefore, the reasoning
should apply to both men and women who exhibit gender
nonconforming characteristics.
The principles regarding sex stereotyping seen in Price
Waterhouse can also be applied to gay people. This is because gay
people, simply by identifying themselves as gay, are violating the
ultimate gender stereotype-heterosexual attraction. Since
there is a "presumption and prescription that erotic interests are
exclusively directed to the opposite sex,"104 those who are
attracted to members of the same sex contradict traditional
notions about appropriate behavior for men and women. 10 5 Just
like the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, gays fail to match the
stereotype associated with their group and any employment
discrimination against a gay person is "because of sex" under
Title VII.
Exactly how anti-gay discrimination is "because of sex"
becomes clear when one asks whether the employer would still
have engaged in discriminatory conduct had the employee been a
member of the opposite sex. Specifically, would the employer
subject a woman who was sexually attracted to men to the same
adverse treatment to which he/she subjected a man also sexually
attracted to men? Similarly, would the employer have treated a
masculine man in the same manner that he/she may have
treated a man who exhibited a feminine affect? Of course, the
answer would be no. It is more than likely that the
discrimination occurred only because of the employee's sex.10 6
102. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). For a discussion of the case see supra Part II.B.3.
103. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
104. Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV.
187, 196.
105. Id. Law writes that the stereotype is that "Ieal men are and should be sexually
attracted to women, and real women invite and enjoy the attraction." Id; see also Toker,
supra note 100, at 600 ("Because heterosexuality is so central to the masculine gender
ideal, a man is usually viewed as gender non-conforming if he is anything other than
heterosexual.").
106. The Supreme Court of Hawaii adopted a similar view of anti-gay discrimination
as sex discrimination. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw. 1993) (holding that
denying same-sex couples the right to marry was sex discrimination under the Hawaii
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2. Discrimination Against Effeminate Gay Men and
Masculine Lesbians Is Primarily Based on Sex Stereotyping
Although all discrimination against gay people could be
considered sex stereotyping per se (based on the idea that being
gay itself is gender nonconforming), it is not always the case that
gays are discriminated against merely for their sexual attraction
or behavior. Rather, much adverse treatment that gay people
receive is based on their expression of non-sexual characteristics
that stereotypically have been associated with members of the
opposite sex.
A 1967 Supreme Court of New Jersey case illustrates the
point that gays are often mistreated not because of whom they
sleep with, but because they exhibit qualities considered
inappropriate for their sex. In One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc.
v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control,/7 the Division had
either suspended or revoked the alcohol licenses of three
different vendors for allowing "apparent homosexuals" to
congregate at their establishments.108 Although no sexual
behavior had been observed by the Division at any of the
establishments, it revoked the vendors' licenses anyway.10 9 In
justifying its decision, the Division observed that some of the
patrons spoke "in a lisping tone of voice, . . .used limp-wrist
movements[,] . . . extended their pinkies in a very dainty
manner[,J ... [and would] swish and sway" when they walked.110
The Division then concluded that "[t]heir actions and
mannerisms and demeanor appeared . . . to be males
impersonating females, they appeared to be homosexuals
constitution because it denied a marriage license to an individual solely on the basis of
the sex of his/her partner). The Supreme Court of Hawaii has since noted, however, that
the Hawaiian Constitution has been amended, making the rationale in Baehr no longer
applicable in Hawaii. Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. Lexis 391, at **6-7 (Haw.
Dec. 9, 1999); see also Lawrence v. State, Nos. 14-99-00109-CR, 14-99-00111-CR, 2000
WL 729417, at *4 (Tex. App. June 8, 2000) (holding that a state law prohibiting same-sex
sodomy violates the Texas Equal Rights Amendment because "the same behavior is
criminal for some, but not for others, based solely on the sex of the individuals who
engage in the behavior").
107. 235 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1967).
108. Id. at 13. At the time of this case, a New Jersey regulation stated that alcohol
vendors were not to allow "lewdness" or "immoral activities" on their premises and were
not to conduct business "in such manner as to become a nuisance." Id. at 14. The
Division used this rule to revoke alcohol licenses from gay bars. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 15.
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commonly known as queers, fags, fruits and other names.""'
Based on this evidence, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
the Division had not been justified in revoking or suspending the
vendors' licenses." 2 What is important about this case, however,
is not the outcome, but rather the reason the case was brought.
What the Division found offensive about the patrons was not
necessarily their sexual orientation per se, but rather how they
expressed their gender and how, in doing so, they were gender
nonconforming.
The harassment that gay youth receive at school also
demonstrates the sex stereotyping roots of anti-gay animus. One
particularly powerful example is provided by Montgomery v.
Independent School District No. 709.113 In that case, a male
student named Jesse Montgomery had been harassed by other
students "almost daily" from kindergarten all the way through
the tenth grade because they perceived him as gay. 14 He was
taunted with names such as "faggot," "princess," "fairy,"
"Jessica," "femme boy," "bitch," "queer," and "pansy.""15 Other
abuse Jesse endured included being super-glued to his seat,
being punched and kicked on the playground, being deliberately
tripped or knocked down during hockey drills and having trash
thrown at him on the bus and in art class. 116 On one occasion,
another student threw Jesse to the ground and pretended to
sodomize him.117
Was Jesse Montgomery subjected to this harassment
because of whom he had sex with? Obviously not. As the
district judge noted, Jesse's peers had begun harassing him
when he was five years old. Therefore:
It is highly unlikely that at that tender age plaintiff would
have developed any solidified sexual preference, or for that
matter, that he even understood what it meant to be
"homosexual" or "heterosexual." The likelihood that he
openly identified himself as gay or that he engaged in any
homosexual conduct at that age is quite low. It is much more
plausible that the students began tormenting him based on
feminine personality traits that he exhibited and the
111. Id.
112. Id. at 19.
113. 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Minn. 2000).
114. Id. at 1084.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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perception that he did not engage in behaviors befitting a
boy." 8
In short, it was Jesse's gender nonconformity, not his sexual
conduct, that led to his adverse treatment.
Anti-gay discrimination based on sex stereotyping is also
found in the employment context. In DeSantis v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,"9 one of the plaintiffs was a gay
male who had been fired from his position as a nursery school
teacher. 120 He was not fired because he was gay, but because he
wore a small gold ear-loop earring.121 Although the plaintiff had
been employed by the nursery school for two years (and
presumably had been gay the whole time), it was not until the
plaintiff wore an earring to work (on a day on which no students
were present) that his employer decided to terminate him.122
Also, as noted in Part I, co-workers subjected the male plaintiff
in Redden v. Contimortgage Corp. 121 to anti-gay harassment even
though he never identified himself as gay. 124 Co-workers
concluded that Redden "must be a fag" based on the fact that he
wore a ring on his left hand and had an effeminate voice. 125
They proceeded to mock the way Redden talked, described him
masturbating at his desk and discussed various sexual practices
in which they insinuated Redden took part.126 In this case, the
harassment the plaintiff received was not explicitly a result of
his sexual orientation, but because of gender nonconforming
characteristics that he exhibited. Redden's co-workers had no
idea whether he was gay, but instead harassed him because he
wore jewelry and had a high voice.127
118. Id. at 1090. Not only did school officials fail to put a stop to this behavior, but
some of them even helped to facilitate it. For example, Jesse claimed that after he was
let off the school bus, the bus driver would wait before pulling away so that students on
the bus could open their windows and taunt Jesse as he walked toward his house. See
id. at 1085 n.5.
119. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
120. Id. at 328.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. No. 99-4435, 1999 WL 1257280 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1999).
124. Id. at *1.
125. Id.
126. Id. at **1-2.
127. It should be noted that this case was not brought under Title VII or a state
discrimination statute, but rather as a tort: intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id. at *1. In Pennsylvania, to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the plaintiff must show that the conduct was "so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Id. at *2. The court held that the
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Similarly, in Dillon v. Frank, 121 the Sixth Circuit rejected a
Title VII sex stereotyping claim brought by Earnest Dillon, a
Michigan postal worker who was subjected to severe harassment
based on his gender nonconformity, including homophobic
epithets and physical assaults. 129 Dillon contended that he was
subjected to sex stereotyping because he was not deemed
"macho" enough by his co-workers for a man. Despite not
disclosing his sexual orientation at work, nor in any court
documents or testimony, the court-like his coworkers-
assumed Dillon was a gay man because of his effeminacy.
Equating gender nonconformity with homosexuality, the Sixth
Circuit held that:
Dillon's co-workers deprived him of a proper work
environment because they believed him to be homosexual.
Their comments, graffiti, and assaults were all directed at
demeaning him solely because they disapproved vehemently
of his alleged homosexuality. These actions, although cruel,
are not made illegal by Title VII.130
Similar examples of anti-gay bias based on gender
nonconformity are countless. The point is that animus against
homosexuals is often based on bias against gender
nonconformity.1 31 In fact, for many courts, homosexuality and
gender nonconformity are seen as interchangeable concepts.
1 32
Individuals are frequently labeled-and discriminated against-
as gay or lesbian (or more likely as "fag" or "dyke"), not because
of sexual behavior, but "because of almost any sign of behavior
which does not fit the [gender] stereotype."133
defendant's conduct did not meet this standard. Id. at *3. Again, it is not the outcome of
the case that is relevant. Rather, this case provides one more example of how anti-gay
harassment is grounded in stereotypical views of the sexes.
128. No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
129. Id. at *1.
130. Id. at *7.
131. Lester, supra note 80, at 116. In fact, Lester argues that gay men "who behave in
[a] stereotypical feminine manner" are "subjected to most some of the vehement forms of
homophobia." Id.
132. See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-
Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV.
511, 607 (1992) ("[Mlany people commonly assume that the set of people who deviate
from gender norms is identical with the set of people with homophile tendencies.').
133. Id. at 632 (citing DAVID P. MCWHIRTER & ANDREW M. MATTISON, THE MALE
COUPLE: HOW RELATIONSHIPS DEVELOP 137 (1984) (citing MARC F. FASTEAU, THE MALE
MACHINE 15 (1974))).
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It is fairly simple, then, to see why Title VII should protect
effeminate men and masculine women from workplace
discrimination. If an employer discriminates against a woman
because she wears pants or has short hair, or discriminates
against a man because he wears an earring or has a lisp, he/she
is trying to suppress conduct that does not conform to his/her
notion of appropriate expressions of gender. Furthermore, if it
was the man who had short hair, or the woman who had
earrings, there would likely be no negative treatment. This
demonstrates that discrimination due to effeminacy in men or
masculine qualities in women is also "because of sex" within the
meaning of Title VII.134
C. Application to Transgendered Individuals
Until now, our discussion has focused almost exclusively on
gay people. Discrimination based on gender identity, however, is
also a form of sex stereotyping.1 3 1 Since transgendered people
identify with the biological sex opposite than that which they
were born with, they are, by definition, gender nonconforming. 136
In fact, one could argue that because transgenderism involves
issues of gender identity rather than orientation, discrimination
against a transgendered person can be classified as "because of
sex" even more easily than for a gay person.13 7 Regardless, there
134. See Case, supra note 31, at 34.
135. See PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, POLICY INST. OF THE NAT'L GAY &
LESBIAN TASK FORCE & NATL CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A
HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVSTS AND POLICY MAKERS 8 (2000) available at
http'//www.ngltf.org/library/index.cfin; Symposium, Queer Law 1999: Current Issues in
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 283, 381 (1999)
[hereinafter Queer Law].
136. Not all members of the gay and transgender communities agree with this
position. Rather, some argue that labeling gay and transgendered individuals as "gender
nonconforming" reflects a narrow and restrictive view of "gender" and will only reinforce
ideas of gender as a dichotomy. See, e.g., Pamela J. Papish, Homosexual Harassment or
Heterosexual Horseplay? The False Dichotomy of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Law, 28
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201, 231 (1996). The response to this argument is that a sex
stereotyping theory under Title VII does not suggest that those plaintiffs do not conform
to their gender. Instead, it only asserts that they have failed to conform to gender
stereotypes that the employer holds about men and women.
137. This was the position taken by one federal district court in the 1980s. Judge
Grady of the Northern District of Illinois held in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F.
Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill. 1983), that the meaning of "sex" in Title VII was not broad enough to
include "sexual preference," but that it did encompass "sexual identity." See id. at 823.
Judge Grady stated that "sex is not a cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes," but that it
is both a question of self-perception and how society perceives that individual. Id. at 825.
Therefore, Title VII should be interpreted as protecting transsexuals from workplace
discrimination. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding
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is a strong argument that both anti-gay and anti-transgender
discrimination are rooted in the same bias against gender
nonconformity, and the arguments used to include gay people in
Title VII protection can be applied to transgendered individuals
as well.
IV. CAN TITLE VII BE USED TO PROTECT GAYS FROM
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION? JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF
"BECAUSE OF SEX" TO GAY PLAINTIFFS
A. Preliminary Questions
Regardless of how sound both the theoretical and legal
arguments are for classifying discrimination against gays as sex
discrimination, little can be accomplished for gay employees
unless judges agree that anti-gay discrimination is "because of
sex" under Title VII. As noted in Part II.B., courts traditionally
have adopted widely diverging views on how "because of sex"
should be interpreted. 38 Application of Title VII to cases
involving homosexuality is certainly no exception and currently
may be the most controversial area of sex discrimination
litigation.
Two issues that invariably affect the chances of success (at
least getting past summary judgment) for a gay plaintiff are the
court's view of the role of congressional intent in Title VII sex
discrimination cases, and the meaning of "sex" as used in the
statute.
1. What Is the Role of Congressional Intent?
Although the reality may be that Congress had no specific
intent when it amended the Civil Rights Act to include a
that Title VII protects neither transsexuals nor homosexuals. See Ulane v. E. Airlines,
Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084-87 (7th Cir. 1984).
One Ninth Circuit judge came to a similar conclusion in another case, arguing in
a dissenting opinion that it should be "irrelevant under Title VII whether the plaintiff
was born female or was born ambiguous and chose to become female." Holloway v.
Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (Goodwin, J., dissenting); see
also Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus. Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding
that a New York City sex discrimination ordinance also prohibits discrimination against
transsexuals).
138. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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prohibition on sex discrimination, 139 no other issue in Title VII
jurisprudence has been disagreed upon more by courts.
Inferring a very limited intent from Congress, some courts
initially denied sex stereotyping and opposite-sex harassment
claims in the 1970s because they believed such claims went
beyond Congress' purposes. 140 Judges used similar reasoning in
the 1990s to deny same-sex harassment claims. 141 Other courts,
however, broadly interpreted the intent of Congress. In Barnes
v. Costle,142 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated:
"Congress chose neither to enumerate specific discriminatory
practices, nor to elucidate in extenso the parameter of such
nefarious activities. Rather, it pursued the path of wisdom
by being unconstrictive, knowing that constant change is the
order of our day and that the seemingly reasonable practices
of the present can easily become the injustices of the
morrow."
14 3
According to the .court in Barnes, "Title VII must be construed
liberally to achieve its objectives,"144 and whether Congress
contemplated a particular form of discrimination should not be a
relevant consideration. 14 Other courts, noting both the original
questionable purpose behind adding "sex" as a protected category
in Title VII and the lack of enlightening legislative history, have
rejected using congressional intent to determine the scope of
Title VII. 146 Presently, all federal courts have recognized that,
although sexual harassment and sex stereotyping claims were
not specifically contemplated by the Congress that passed the
Civil Rights Act, such claims fall within the legislation's basic
purposes and are actionable under Title VII.
147
139. Id.
140. See Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978) (denying sex
stereotyping claim); Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F.Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J.
1976) (denying a sexual harassment claim), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1978).
141. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir.
1999).
142. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
143. Id. at 994 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F.Supp. 351, 354 (D. Nev. 1996);
see also Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1997) ("As for
congressional intent, the legislative history suggests that legislators had very little
preconceived notion of what types of sex discrimination they were dealing with when
they enacted Title VII .... It is, ultimately, the plain, unambiguous language of the
statute upon which we must focus.").
147. E.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
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Notably, when the Supreme Court has relied upon
congressional intent in interpreting Title VII, it has construed
the intent liberally. In reference to the purposes of Title VII, the
Supreme Court has reiterated that "Congress had always
intended to protect all individuals from sex discrimination in
employment,"14  that Title VII created a "broad rule of
workplace equality," 149 and that it was meant to strike at the
"entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in
employment."'5 0
In its most recent opinions, the Court has de-emphasized
altogether the role of congressional intent in interpreting Title
VII. In Oncale, the Court stated that statutes are often used to
protect against more than just the "principal evil" at which the
statute was directed. 151 The statute can also be applied to
"reasonably comparable evils."152 Furthermore, "it is ultimately
the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of
our legislators by which we are governed." 153 Oncale then stands
for the principle that a cause of action may be recognized under
Title VII even though Congress did not contemplate it when the
statute was passed, as long the cause of action is based on a
"comparable evil" and is consistent with the statutory
language.154
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting
that they match the stereotype associated with their group, for "[i]n
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."
Id. (citations omitted); Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (stating
that Title VII encompasses sexual harassment because it is an "'arbitrary barrier to
sexual equality at the workplace'") (citations omitted).
148. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 681 (1983).
149. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (emphasis added).
150. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (quoting
Mentor, 477 U.S. at 64) (emphasis added); see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 ("[The
language in Title VII] 'evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women .... .") (citations omitted); Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 251 (same).
151. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Under this view, anti-gay discrimination should fall within Title VII's
prohibitions. As discrimination based on sexual orientation is based on, and contributes
to, misogyny, it is a "comparable evil" to discrimination against women (if not the same
evil). Furthermore, as will be discussed in the next section, there is nothing inconsistent
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Congressional intent, therefore, should not be a barrier to
providing gays with protection from workplace discrimination
under Title VII. If courts look either to the general rather than
the specific purposes of Title VII, thereby encouraging employers
to focus on qualifications rather than arbitrary factors, or simply
discount legislative intent all together (because it is impossible
to determine), including gays under Title VII protection is little
more than a continuation of the principles already established.
Regardless of whether the intent of Congress should be a
barrier to recognizing Title VII claims based on sexual
orientation, courts generally still treat it as one. Congressional
intent is often cited in decisions denying relief to gays and other
gender nonconformists who bring sex discrimination claims. 155
Gay plaintiffs' chances of even getting past a motion to dismiss
will be greatly diminished in courts that consider the specific
intent of Congress in enacting Title VII to be a dispositive factor
in deciding a case, as compared to courts that look either to the
general purposes of the Civil Rights Act or downplay the role of
congressional intent. 156
with the statute's language and the view that Title VII prohibits workplace
discrimination against gays.
155. E.g., Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992);
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget Mktg.,
Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329
(9th Cir. 1977); Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 509, 516 (E.D. Pa.
2000). Even courts that acknowledge the similarity between the rejection of sexual
harassment claims in the 1970s and the rejection of claims based on sexual orientation
today still reject Title VII sexual orientation claims by noting that, although the
Supreme Court has recognized sexual harassment claims, it has not done the same for
sexual orientation. See Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 733 (N.D. Ill.
1996). Similarly, even courts that have acknowledged that there is "little legislative
history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibitions against discrimination based on
sex," have nonetheless referred to congressional intent in rejecting Title VII claims based
on sexual orientation. See Simonton v. Runyon, No. 99-6180, 2000 WL 1575481, at *2
(2d Cir. Aug. 22, 2000).
156. It is quite likely, however, that courts that rely heavily on legislative intent in
Title VII sex discrimination cases are using it simply to buttress a conclusion they
already made about the desirability of using Title VII to protect gay plaintiffs from
workplace discrimination. Therefore, in the absence of an express statutory prohibition
against sexual orientation discrimination, these courts would deny claims brought by gay
plaintiffs regardless of their actual belief regarding legislative intent, and would find
another reason to deny them if the congressional intent reasoning was absent. This is
one reason why separate legislation protecting gay people from discrimination, such as
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), is needed. See discussion infra Part
V.
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Rejecting the use of legislative intent in favor of using the
"plain language" of the amendment has its own problems, as
there is also disagreement on what the language actually means.
2. How Should "Sex" Be Defined? The Judicial Conflation
of Sex and Gender.
Closely related to the issue of congressional intent is the
issue of how courts should interpret the word "sex" in Title VII.
The question is whether "sex" means only "biological
distinctions" or if it extends to the expression of masculinity and
femininity. How this debate is resolved is important because if
"sex" is determined to include expressions of gender rather than
just anatomy, gender nonconforming plaintiffs (including gays)
have a greater likelihood of succeeding in Title VII claims. This
is because the expression of feminine or masculine traits causes
discrimination against gays.
Scholars have argued that a biological/anatomical view of
"sex" ignores "culturally constructed dimensions." By failing to
account for the socially constructed aspects of sex, this view also
fails to acknowledge that "[b]iology and culture are all. part of
one piece when it comes to how society's ideas about men and
women are and should be." 157 Furthermore, since "almost every
claim with regard to sexual identity or sex discrimination can be
shown to be grounded in normative gender rules and roles,"5 s
sex discrimination laws that limit protection to biological
distinctions can never be fully effective. A prohibition of
discrimination based on "sex" should include a prohibition of
discrimination based on masculine and feminine qualities as
well.
The Supreme Court appeared to agree with this position,
and arguably resolved the debate more than ten years ago in
Price Waterhouse. By expressly adopting sex stereotyping as a
form of sex discrimination, the Supreme Court essentially took
the position that Title VII prohibits not just discrimination based
on biological distinctions, but also gender expression by an
157. Lester, supra note 80, at 98; see also Fajer, supra note 132, at 515 n.16 (arguing
that the distinction between biological and socially constructed differences is "difficult to
make and tends to bide the extent to which most gender differences are at least partially
socially constructed"); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination
Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995) ("Ultimately,
there is no principled way to distinguish sex from gender, and concomitantly, sexual
differentiation from sexual discrimination.").
158. Franke, supra note 157, at 2.
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employee. This conclusion is underscored by the Court's use of
the word "gender" throughout the opinion.15 9 This language
choice is important because while "sex" is often defined as
referring only to biological distinctions, "gender" also includes
"socially constructed differences." i6° If "sex" in Title VII is
interpreted as meaning the same thing as "gender," the
implication is that Title VII does not only protect against
discrimination based on biological sex, but also on any expression
of gender as well.
Despite these indications by the Supreme Court, courts are
still confused over the meaning of "sex" in Title VII. Some
jurisdictions, most notably the Seventh Circuit, have followed
the Supreme Court's "gender" approach to Title VII. For
instance, in Doe v. City of Belleville,161 the court of appeals used
the words "sex" and "gender" interchangeably, stating that
gender under Title VII is defined as "the way in which [an
employee] project[s] the sexual aspect of his personality"' 62 and
there is sex discrimination if an employee is singled out because
159. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) ("[A]n employer may not
take gender into account.") (emphasis added); id. at 240 ("We take these words
[prohibiting sex discriminationi to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment
decisions.") (emphasis added); id. at 250 ("In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive ... has
acted on the basis of gender.") (emphasis added).
160. See Fajer, supra note 132, at 650-51. Justice Scalia made this same observation
in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated by City of Belleville v. Doe, 523 U.S. 1001
(1998). After Doe was decided by the Seventh Circuit, the case was appealed to the
Supreme Court and the Court granted certiorari. In the meantime, the Supreme Court
handed down the Oncale decision. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S.
75 (1998). Subsequently, Doe was vacated and remanded back to the Seventh Circuit to
be redecided "in light of Oncale." Doe v, City of Belleville, 523 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1998).
This never happened, however, as the parties then reached a settlement. For a
discussion of the implications of Doe being vacated, see infra notes 162, 180.
162. See Doe, 119 F.3d at 580. At least some district courts in the Seventh Circuit
have continued to follow this view, even after Doe was vacated and remanded by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-C-0452, 1999 WL 754568,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1999) (noting that there is sex discrimination when the employee
is "singled out because of the way he projected his gender, or how his gender was
perceived by his co-workers"). However, some of the basic premises of Doe were
undermined recently by Hamner v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care Center, Inc., 224
F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000). In that case, the court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge
Manion (who dissented in Doe), held that it was not reasonable for a gay male nurse who
was fired after filing a sexual harassment grievance against his employer to believe that
he was protected from retaliation by his employer under Title VII. See id. at 707. In so
holding, Hamner both adopted a "sex as biological distinctions" view and rejected Doe's
suggestion that sex and sexual orientation discrimination were closely linked. See id. at
704-07. Hamner, however, never cites to Doe, or explicitly disagrees with its holding, so
it is not clear to what extent the reasoning behind Doe is undermined or if district courts
will continue to rely on it in the future.
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the way in which he/she projects his/her gender does not conform
to gender stereotypes. 163 More recently, the Ninth Circuit, in
Schwenk v. Hartford,164 stated that "under Price Waterhouse,
'sex' under Title VII encompasses both sex-that is, the
biological differences between men and women-and gender," or
socially-constructed characteristics. 165 Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit stated that sex and gender are "interchangeable" for
purposes of Title VII.1' The court concluded that
"[dliscrimination because one fails to act in the way expected of a
man or a woman is forbidden under Title VII."167 The Third
Circuit also has held that Title VII prohibits sex discrimination
based on either biologically-based differences or
socially/culturally-based differences. 1' Even courts that have
adopted a restricted view of "sex" under Title VII (because of
their perception of congressional intent) concede that the
meaning of "sex" could be broad enough to include "psychological
* . . characteristics" if one limits the analysis to the language of
the statute.169
In contrast, some courts have held that "sex" and "gender"
are distinct concepts and, therefore, Title VII should be
construed to apply only to biological differences. The first
decision to reach this conclusion was Holloway v. Arthur
Anderson & Co. 170 In Holloway, the court held that "sex" was
not synonymous with "gender," and that the meaning of sex
should be limited to its "traditional meaning."171 Holloway,
however, was decided twelve years before Price Waterhouse and
its continuing relevance has been questioned by both courts and
commentators alike. 172
Even after Price Waterhouse, however, some courts may still
cling to the Holloway position. For example, in Klein v.
163. Doe, 119 F.3d at 580.
164. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
165. See id. at 1202.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. E.g., Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[W]e have
not considered 'sex' and 'gender' to be distinct concepts for Title VII purposes.").
169. Hopkins v. Bait. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1996).
170. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
171. Id. at 663.
172. See generally Kristine W. Holt, Comment, Reevalutaing Holloway: Title VII,
Equal Protection, and the Evolution of a Transgender Jurisprudence, 70 TEMP. L. REV.
283 (1997) (examining how current civil rights statutes, including Title VII, could provide
protection for transgendered persons). In fact, the Ninth Circuit (where Holloway was
decided) recently stated that the Price Waterhouse decision effectively overruled
Holloway. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000).
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McGowan,'17 3 the court held that "gender" and "sex" were not
equivalent for the purposes of Title VII.174 The court stated that
if gender and sex were equivalent, then both discrimination
based on effeminate behavior and the perception that an
employee is gay would be prohibited by Title VII since gender
would encompass "'masculinity' and other sexual aspects of a
person's personality."175 The court found that the two concepts
were not the same. 176 Consequently, Title VII did not protect
either effeminacy or homosexuality. 177
Similarly, in Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,'7 a
case that Klein cited for support, the District Court of Maine
noted that "sex" and "gender" are distinct concepts. 179 The court
expressed doubt regarding the validity of a Title VII
interpretation that would prohibit discrimination based on both
biological and social/cultural distinctions.180 The court never
173. 36 F. Supp. 2d 885 (D. Minn. 1999), affd, 198 F.3d 705 (8th Cir. 1999).
174. Id. at 889-90.
175. Id. at 890.
176. Id.
177. Id. It should be noted that only two months later, the judge that decided Klein
adopted a significantly broader view of sex in Breitenfeldt v. Long Prairie Packing Co., 48
F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Minn. 1999). Although the Breitenfeldt decision did not return to a
discussion of the meaning of "sex" in Title VII and made no mention of the Klein decision,
it did state that sexually explicit remarks directed at homosexual behavior created an
issue of fact regarding whether harassment had occurred "because of sex." Id. at 1176. If
.sex" is limited to mean only anatomical sex, such harassment would likely not fall
within the purview of Title VII. This change is inexplicable and demonstrates the
confusion that courts have had in trying to interpret the "because of sex" requirement.
178. 21 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Me. 1998), affd in part, 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999).
179. Id. at 75.
180. Id. The district court based this doubt on the Supreme Court's decision to vacate
and remand Doe v. City of Belleville in light of its opinion in Oncale. Id. at 75 n.9. The
district court noted that the court in Doe had adopted a "gender approach" to Title VII
and opined that the Supreme Court may have vacated the decision because it disagreed
with Doe's position. Id. The Supreme Court, however, did not provide any reasoning as
to why it vacated Doe (other than it was 'in light of Oncale") and did not. state that it
disagreed with any part of the Doe holding.
Even if the decision to vacate Doe was an expression of disapproval on some level,
the district court was in no position to determine with which aspect of the decision the
Supreme Court disagreed. Doe was a lengthy and complex decision that touched on
many Title VII sex discrimination issues. Therefore, any conclusion by the district court
in Higgins as to what part of Doe the Supreme Court disagreed with is mere speculation.
It is doubtful that Doe's view of the meaning of "sex" had anything to do with the
Supreme Court's decision to remand the case, as Oncale itself did not address that issue.
If the Supreme Court's decision to vacate and remand Doe "in light of Oncale" was meant
to suggest disapproval of that case on some level, it is likely that it would be based on
Doe's view that all sexually explicit harassment is "because of sex" under Title VII, see
discussion infra note 284, as it was the only aspect of Doe with which the Supreme Court
expressly disagreed. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80
(1998).
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actually took a position on the issue, however, as it held that
even under a "gender approach," the plaintiff still failed to create
an issue of fact.18 1 Other jurisdictions have similarly held that
"sex" should be limited to its "traditional" definition and should
apply only to "immutable characteristics." 8 2  It is important to
note, however, that unlike Schwenk and Doe, the cases adopting
the narrow meaning of "sex" failed to address the Price
Watehouse decision.
Still other courts are even more confused. They have
followed Price Waterhouse by using the words "sex" and "gender"
interchangeably, but have departed from Price Waterhouse by
choosing to define "gender" as including only biological
distinctions. In Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.,' 8 3 the
Fourth Circuit stated that equating "sex" with "gender" actually
limited the meaning of "sex" under Title VII, which could
otherwise be interpreted as including sexual behavior.Y,
Instead, "sex" should be limited to a "man or woman."18 5 Many
Furthermore, district courts in the Seventh Circuit have concluded that Doe is
generally consistent with Oncale and remains a viable decision. Spearman v. Ford Motor
Co., No. 98-C-0452, 1999 WL 754568, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1999).
181. Higgins, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 76. The district court decision was then appealed to
the First Circuit. The First Circuit affirmed in part and remanded the decision, but did
not explicitly discuss its view of the sex/gender debate. Higgins, 194 F.3d at 256.
However, the First Circuit adopted the view that Title VII prohibited discrimination
against both men and women for failing to meet stereotypical expectations of masculinity
or femininity, thus suggesting that it would also take the "gender approach." See id. at
261 n.4.
182. See Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th
Cir. 2000) (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984))
("Congress intended the term 'sex' to mean 'biological male or biological female,' and not
one's sexuality or sexual orientation."); see also Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL
5436, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992). The court in Dillon based its opinion on the fact that
the drafters placed "sex" in Title VII along side other "immutable" characteristics such as
race, color, and national origin. Id. Although the court acknowledged that the drafters
also included religion, a non-immutable characteristic, it stated that religion was "so
deeply rooted for most that it was almost immutable." Id. Even accepting this
argument, however, would not necessarily lead to a conclusion that sexual orientation or
gender identity are not included in the meaning of"sex." They are also, at least arguably
as much as religion, "deeply rooted" characteristics.
183. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).
184. Id. at 749 n.1. Courts, such as those in Hopkins and Dillon, have suggested that
in order for gays to be protected under Title VII, "sex" would have to be interpreted as
including anything "sexual." Id.; Dillon, 1992 WL 5436, at *4. Nothing, however, could
be further from the truth. One of the main theses of this Article is that anti-gay
discrimination often has nothing to do with sexual behavior, but rather is about a strict
view of gender roles.
185. Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 749 n.1.
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courts seem to have taken a similar view that "sex" and "gender"
mean the same thing and that both terms refer only to physical
characteristics. 8 6
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale has
not dispelled the confusion in the circuits regarding the meaning
of "sex" in Title VII, as the Court wrote Oncale in vague terms
and failed to express its opinion on the issue. 87 Because of this,
there is no less disagreement among the circuits after Oncale
than there was before. Oncale, however, did nothing to
undermine the decision in Price Waterhouse, so the Court's view
of sex discrimination in that case should still be controlling.
Regardless, there still exists an uneven application of Price
Waterhouse. Whether a court decides to adopt a "gender
approach" in defining "sex" has important implications for gay
plaintiffs. In fact, a court's view of the meaning of sex could be
even more dispositive than its view of congressional intent
(though the two are closely linked). Although a gender approach
will greatly improve a plaintiffs chances of getting past
summary judgment, a biological definition of "sex" by the court
means an almost certain adverse ruling.188
B. Is a Claim Based Explicitly on Sexual Orientation Actionable
Under Title VII?
Despite the arguments supporting a view of discrimination,
based on sexual orientation as a form of sex discrimination and a
lack of congressional intent that would prohibit such a view,
federal courts thus far have not been receptive to Title VII
claims based on a sexual orientation theory. Currently there are
no jurisdictions that recognize a Title VII claim based explicitly
on a sexual orientation theory. Claims based on discrimination
against transgendered individuals have faced similar
treatment. 8 9  Even courts that have expressed willingness to
186. E.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that harassment by a male supervisor to a male employee is not covered by Title VII);
Mimes v. Carrier Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 706, 714 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that sexual
orientation is not protected under the Civil Rights Act); Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 2a 509, 516 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (stating that Congress intended
"sex" in Title VII to refer to the male/female distinction).
187. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-80 (1998).
188. See discussion and sources cited sup'ra note 184.
189. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting a Title
VII claim brought by a transsexual); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750
(8th Cir. 1982) (same). But see Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 396
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protect gay plaintiffs under other theories still have held that
sexual orientation cannot form the basis of a Title VII claim.19°
Likewise, the EEOC, the federal agency responsible for
investigating Title VII violations and author of the Title VII
compliance manual, has rejected an interpretation of the statute
that would extend Title VII protection to discrimination based on
sexual orientation. 191  There is at least one district court,
however, that has suggested that whether Title VII applies
expressly to anti-gay discrimination is still an issue subject to
reconsideration. 192 In addition, at least one state has recognized
sexual harassment claims based on sexual orientation; others
have suggested that the possibility is there. 193
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting sex discrimination
protects transsexuals).
190. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 593 (7th Cir. 1997). Doe did acknowledge
that many scholars have concluded that anti-gay bias should be viewed as a form a sex
discrimination. Id. at 593 n.27. The court declined to adopt this position, but stated that
there is "a considerable overlap in the origins of sex discrimination and homophobia...
[and] it is not always possible to rigidly compartmentalize the types of bias that [anti-
gay] ... epithets represent." Id.
191. See Papish, supra note 136, at 207 n.29 ('"If a male supervisor harasses a male
employee because of the employee's homosexuality, then the supervisor's conduct would
not be sexual harassment since it is based on the employee's sexual preference, not his
gender . . . . ) (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (CCH) § 615.2(b)(3) (1991)).
Although the EEOC's interpretations of Title VII are not binding on a court, they ."do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance."'" Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)
(citations omitted).
192. Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-C0452, 1999 WL 754568, at *6 n.4 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 9, 1999). ("[Tlhe Seventh Circuit, at present, has decided that discrimination based
upon sexual orientation is beyond the reach of Title VII .... [Anti-gay discrimination] as
.of yet is not recognized as impermissible under Title VII.. . ." (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)).
193. See Hanke v. Safari Hair Adventure, 512 N.W.2d 614, 616 (Minn. App. 1994)
(holding that harassment based on an employee's sexual orientation gave the employee
good cause to quit under the state's sex discrimination statute). Although Minnesota
currently has a statute expressly prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation,
no such statute existed when the harassment in Hanke occurred. Id. at 617 n.1.
In addition, one justice on the Ohio Supreme Court has likewise indicated that
.sex" could be interpreted to include "sexual orientation" in the future. In Retterer v.
Whirlpool Corp., 729 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio 2000), the court dismissed a claim brought by a
gay plaintiff under the state's sex discrimination statute because it was barred by claim
preclusion. Id. at 760. However, Justice Pfeifer wrote in a concurring opinion that, had
the suit been properly brought, it "should have survived summary judgment." Id.
(Pfeifer, J., concurring). Justice Pfeifer further stated:
This case might have presented the opportunity for us to consider
whether discrimination based upon sexual orientation is also actionable
under R.C. 4112.02(A) [the state's anti-discrimination statute that
prohibits "sex" discrimination]. The abusive behavior that might give
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As noted in Part IV.A.1, courts generally rely on the
assumption that protecting gay people from discrimination is
beyond what Congress intended for Title VII.194 In addition,
some courts note that proposals to amend Title VII to include
sexual orientation as a protected category have been offered
several times and always been rejected. 195 Often, courts simply
cite other jurisdictions that have rejected claims based on sexual
orientation and then conclude without reasoning that they will
reject such claims as well.1 6
Regardless of the justifications given, all courts currently
agree that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation qua sexual orientation. At least today, a
plaintiff making a Title VII claim based on a sexual orientation
theory has virtually no chance of success. 197 It is important to
note that, although Oncale did not express disapproval of the
various circuit decisions holding that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation, it also did not state
that such claims are barred. Therefore, in theory at least, the
rise to such a cause of action continues to exist even in this supposedly
enlightened day, and certainly it is only a matter of time before the
question of sexual-orientation discrimination (and whether it is merely
the opposite side of the same sexual-harassment coin) is properly before
this court.
Id. at 760-61 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).
194. See Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *7 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992)
("'Congress designed Title VII to prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes and a sense of
degradation which serve to close or discourage employment opportunities for women.')
(citation omitted). Courts taking this position have failed to address arguments
concerning the connection between bias against gays and "stereotypes," and the
"degradation" of women presented in Part III.A, and why specific, rather than general,
congressional intent should be used in interpreting the statute.
'The damage that a court's heavy reliance on the specific intent of Congress will
do to gay plaintiffs cannot be overemphasized. At least one court that took a restricted
view of "because of sex" (based on its perception of congressional intent) conceded that, if
only the language of the statute is considered, an argument could be made that Title VII
prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation. Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co.,
77 F.3d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1996).
195. E.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979).
196. Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989);
Simonton v. Runyon, 50 F. Supp. 2d 159, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
197. Some courts, however, may go out of their way to avoid dismissing a claim based
on sexual orientation if the court believes the claim would otherwise be valid. For
example, in Schmedding v. Tnemee Co., 187 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 1999), the Eighth Circuit
allowed a plaintiff to delete the phrase "perceived sexual preference" in his complaint
and replace it with "sex" so that the plaintiff would have a cognizable Title VII claim. Id.
at 865.
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Supreme Court has left the door open for lower courts to
recognize Title VII claims based on sexual orientation.
B. Arguing Anti-Gay Discrimination as Per Se Sexual
Stereotyping Under Title VII
Rather than allege discrimination based on sexual
orientation in their complaints, some gay plaintiffs have tried to
argue that anti-gay discrimination is sex stereotyping per se
because it is based on the belief that people can only engage in
sexual relations with members of the opposite sex. This
argument has not been made in federal court often; when it has,
it has been unsuccessful. It was first asserted-and rejected-in
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone'& Telegraph Co.198 In DeSantis,
one of the plaintiffs had been rejected for employment because
he was gay.19 He argued that he would not have been
discriminated against for preferring males as sexual partners
had he been a woman; therefore, this was impermissible sex-plus
discrimination under Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp.2°°
because it allowed different employment criteria for men and
women. 20 1 The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument, stating that
the plaintiff was trying to "bootstrap Title VII protection for
homosexuals" and that there was no sex discrimination because
the employer's policy applied to both gay men and lesbians. °2
The argument has fared no better in more recent decisions.
In Dandan v. Radisson Hotel Lisle, 20 3 the Northern District of
198. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
199. Id. at 328.
200. 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) ("[Tlhe Court of Appeals erred in . permitting one
hiring policy for women and another for men....").
201. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 331.
202. Id. This reasoning is weak and contradicts the logic behind the prohibition of
sex-plus discrimination. As the Supreme Court observed in City of Los Angeles
Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), "the basic policy of [Title
VII] requires that we focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes." Id.
at 709. Therefore, the analysis that a court should go through is whether the individual
was discriminated against because he/she was a man or a woman, not whether an entire
group receives discrimination. Even if the employer's policy did apply to both gay men
and lesbians, it would not change the fact that the employer had discriminated against
that particular gay man for failing to conform to gender stereotypes.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected a related argument. In addition to his sex
stereotyping argument, the plaintiff in DeSantis also argued that because there are more
gay men than gay women, anti-gay discrimination disproportionately affects men and is,
therefore, really sex discrimination. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 329. The court rejected this
argument because protecting homosexuals was not part of Congress' intentions. Id. at
330.
203. No. 97-C8342, 2000 WL 336528 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2000).
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Illinois denied the Title VII claim of a man who argued that the
anti-gay harassment he received was based on his nonconformity
to "co-workers' expectations of what a man should be or how he
should live his life."2 °4 The court provided no reasoning for the
denial, but simply stated that the argument had "no precedential
underpinning."20 5
Although the argument of anti-gay discrimination as sex
stereotyping per se has not been successful, it has not been
asserted enough times to conclude that no court would be
receptive to hearing it. 206 As noted in Part III.B.1, the argument
is entirely consistent with the principles set forth in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.207 Furthermore, there is nothing in
Oncale to controvert an anti-gay bias as sex stereotyping
theory.2 8 It is likely that most trial courts would be reluctant to
be the first to make such a holding, but there is no principled
basis for refusing to do so.
C. Is Discrimination Against Gays Ever Considered
Discrimination "Because of Sex?"
Title VII claims that rely explicitly on a sexual orientation
theory or try to characterize all anti-gay discrimination as
inherently based on sex stereotyping are likely to be rejected by
federal courts, at least for the time being. This does not mean
that gay plaintiffs who are discriminated against or harassed
have no chance of succeeding on a Title VII claim.
First, it is important to note that, at least in theory, Title
VII protects gays from sex discrimination to the same extent it
protects heterosexuals.20 9 If a lesbian woman were rejected from
204. Id. at *4.
205. Id.
206. In fact, in Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (lst Cir.
1999), the First Circuit implied that it would be open to considering whether employers
who discriminate against men for being sexually attracted to other men are sex
stereotyping under Title VII. Although the court in Higgins refused to consider this
argument, it was not because it had no merit, but because the plaintiff had failed to raise
that issue at the trial court level. Id. at 260.
207. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
208. Toni Lester argues that Oncale actually supports this argument and can be cited
at the trial court level in order to present experts testifying "about how stereotyping of
male and female sex roles in our society is a form of sex discrimination that leads to gay
bashing and the harassment of [gender nonconformists] in general." Lester, supra note
80, at 103.
209. See Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996)
("Although Title VII does not include a prohibition on discrimination based on sexual
orientation, homosexuals are just as protected by Title VI's existing protections as
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a position for which she was qualified, based solely on the fact
that she was female (rather than a lesbian), she should have a
cause of action under Title VII in every jurisdiction. The
availability of such relief, however, provides little comfort to gay
and lesbian employees who are harassed or discriminated
against not simply because they are men or women, but because
they are men or women with one or more gender nonconforming
characteristic.
As noted in Part III.B.2, anti-gay discrimination often is not
based on the victim's actual sexual orientation, but on the
perception that his/her mannerisms and appearance are
inappropriate for his/her sex (i.e., too "feminine" for men or too
"masculine" for women). Because this is a form of gender
stereotyping, individuals subject to adverse treatment for this
reason should have an actionable discrimination claim under
Title VII as stated in Price Waterhouse.210 Unlike claims based
explicitly on a sexual orientation theory, however, claims based
on gender nonconformity have sometimes been successful.
Before Price Waterhouse, federal courts uniformly held that
discrimination against effeminate men was not prohibited by
Title VII.211 Although since Price Waterhouse, all federal courts
have recognized sex stereotyping as a form of sex discrimination,
how courts have applied the principles enunciated in that case,
particularly in cases involving issues of homosexuality, has been
extremely uneven.
On a conceptual level, there appears to be no reason why
Price Waterhouse would not apply equally to all gender
nonconforming employees. The opinion neither limited the types
of sex stereotyping that were impermissible nor specifically
excluded gays from protection. Some courts have recognized
that gender stereotyping applies to more than just the specific
fact situation in Price Waterhouse and have expressed
willingness to use Title VII to protect employees who are gay or
perceived to be gay. Others have been extremely reluctant to do
so and are much more likely to characterize any Title VII claim
anyone else.... Title VII protects all persons, whether male or female, heterosexual or
homosexual, from discrimination based on sex.").
210. Price Waterhouse v. Cooper, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
211. See Desantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331-32 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978). There is a lack of case law prior
to Price Waterhouse regarding female employees discriminated against for exhibiting
traditionally masculine characteristics.
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brought by a gay plaintiff as a sexual orientation claim rather
than a sex discrimination claim, particularly when the claim is
brought by a man.212
Among courts that have suggested they would recognize all
sexual stereotyping as being "because of sex," regardless of
whether a claim is brought by gay or heterosexual plaintiffs, is
the Seventh Circuit in Doe.211 In that case, the court, using Price
Waterhouse as its model, held that "Title VII does not permit an
employee to be treated adversely because his or her appearance
or conduct does not conform to stereotypical gender roles."214
More specifically, the court stated:
[A] man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his
physique is slight, his hair is long, or because in some other
respect he exhibits his masculinity in a way that does not
meet his co-workers' idea of how men are to appear and
behave, is harassed "because of" his sex.215
This prohibition against sex stereotyping extended to harassing
a plaintiff for wearing an earring since such harassment is based
on the belief that only women should wear jewelry.2 1 6
The Ninth Circuit in Schwenk, also citing Price Waterhouse,
likewise stated that an employer is prohibited from
discriminating against an employee who "fails to act in the way
expected of a man or a woman."21 Specifically, discrimination
against an employee who was biologically male, but whose
"appearance and mannerisms were very feminine," would be
212. Of course, such a characterization will inevitably lead to the claim being
dismissed since no federal court currently recognizes a Title VII claim based on sexual
orientation. For a discussion of why gay males have a diminished chance of success in
prevailing on a Title VII claim as compared to lesbians, see infra Part IV.E.3.
213. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 581. The court in Doe also strongly rejected the defendant's argument that
sex stereotyping is only prohibited by Title VII if it is based on personality traits and not
on how an employee dresses. Id. at 582. The court noted that the Supreme Court in
Price Waterhouse had found the advice given to Ann Hopkins by the defendant to "dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry" highly probative
of sex discrimination. Id. at 580-81 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 409 U.S. 228,
235 (1989)).
216. Id. at 581-82.
217. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000). The actual holding in
Schwenk involved an interpretation of the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA),
rather than Title VII. Id. at 1201. However, the Ninth Circuit noted that the "because of
sex" requirement in Title VII and the "because of gender" requirement in the GMVA
were proven in the same way. Id. at 1200-01. The court then analyzed precedent under
Title VII in order to reach its interpretation of GMVA, noting that, "GMVA does parallel
Title VII." Id. at 1201-02.
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unlawful under Title VII.21 8 Under these views, gay employees
treated adversely by their employers because they were not
sufficiently masculine or feminine would have a cognizable Title
VII claim.
Oncale does nothing to contradict these views. In fact, the
First Circuit, in Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,219
has interpreted Oncale as extending the Price Waterhouse
principle, that employers cannot discriminate against women for
failing to meet stereotypical expectations of femininity, to also
protect men from being discriminated against for failing to meet
stereotypical expectations of masculinity.220
Despite the Supreme Court rulings in both Price Waterhouse
and Oncale, some courts still have chosen to apply the
prohibition against sex stereotyping very narrowly.221  For
example, in Mims v. Carrier Corp.,222 the Eastern District of
Texas completely disregarded Price Waterhouse in a case that
involved sex stereotyping.223  Instead, the court continued to
treat Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,224 a case holding
that Title VII does not protect effeminate men from
discrimination, as controlling precedent.225 Other courts, while
not expressly rejecting sex stereotyping theories, simply re-
characterize discrimination based on gender nonconformity as
actually based on sexual orientation.226 In courts taking this
218. Id. at 1202. For other courts making similar holdings regarding the scope of
impermissible sex stereotyping under Title VII, see Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-
C0452, 1999 WL 754568, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1999) ( "Title VII does not permit an
employee to be treated adversely because his or her appearance or behavior does not
conform to gender stereotypes."); Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., No. 99-2309, 2000
WL 726228 at *3 (lst Cir. June 8, 2000) (holding that discrimination based on an
individual's gender nonconforming clothing is impermissible sex discrimination); cf
Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1093 (D. Minn. 2000)
(holding that student harassed for failing "to meet masculine stereotypes" stated a claim
for sex discrimination under Title IX).
219. 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999).
220. Id. at 261 n.4. This view of Oncale is supported by comments made by Justice
Ginsberg during oral argument. Justice Ginsberg suggested that the plaintiff would
have a cognizable claim under Title VII if he could show that he was discriminated
against because he was not "the right kind of male." See Real Player Audio File: Oral
Argument for Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Service., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, at
http://oyez.nwu.edu/cases/cases.cgi?command=show&caseid=1108 (Dec. 3, 1997) [here-
inafter Oral Argument].
221. It is not surprising that the same courts which take a more inclusive view of the
meaning of "sex" are also more willing to apply Price Waterhouse in all sex stereotyping
situations rather than only in situations nearly identical factually to those cases.
222. 88 F. Supp. 2d 706 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
223. Id. at 713.
224. 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
225. See Mims, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 713.
226. See Sarffv. Cont'l Express, 894 F. Supp. 1076, 1081 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
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limited view of impermissible sex stereotyping, gender
nonconforming employees of any kind (except perhaps women
who are "aggressive"), will have little chance of successfully
asserting a Title VII claim.
Most courts have not gone this far. Neither are many as
openly accepting of gender stereotyping claims as the Seventh
Circuit in Doe. The challenge gay plaintiffs face, then, is
showing that the discrimination they received results from
"actionable" sex stereotyping and not anti-gay bias alone.
Oncale states that in all sex discrimination cases, the
"critical issue. . . is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed." 27 Many courts
deciding sex discrimination cases since Oncale have quoted this
language as being the ultimate test in deciding whether the
discrimination was "because of sex."228 Sex stereotyping would
satisfy the Oncale test, but there is still inconsistency among the
courts in determining how and when sex stereotyping can be
shown.
1. Proving That Discrimination Is Based on Sex
Stereotyping
Because all federal courts currently agree that
discrimination "because of sexual orientation" is not actionable
under Title VII, if a court finds that an employee is harassed
because he/she is gay, lesbian, or bisexual, the employee's Title
VII suit will most likely be dismissed. To avoid this finding, a
gay plaintiff would somehow have to show that the employer's
discriminatory motive was "because of sex" and not "because of
sexual orientation'-aan allegation of sex stereotyping typically is
not sufficient.229  Courts across the country have taken a
number of positions on how this can and cannot be accomplished.
227. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, S0 (1998) (quoting Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)).
228. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1008 (7th Cir. 1999); Carassco v.
Lenox Hill Hosp., No. 99 CIV. 927(AGS), 2000 WL 520640, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2000);
Dandan v. Radisson Hotel Lisle, No. 97-C8342, 2000 WL 336528, at *4 (N.D. Ill Mar. 28,
2000); Mimes, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 714 n.4; Samborski v. W. Valley Nuclear Servs. Co., No.
99-CV00213E(M), 1999 WL 1293351, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1999).
229. See Simonton v. Runyon, No. 99-6180, 2000 WL 1575481, at *4 (2d Cir. 2000)
(dismissing Title VII claim of gay plaintiff because there was "no basis to infer from the
complaint that the harassment Simonton suffered was because of his sex and not...
because of his sexual orientation"). A mere allegation could be enough in some cases to
1072000]
108 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 7:67
a. Gender Stereotyping Remarks or Conduct by
the Defendant
Most likely because the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse showed
that her employer was engaged in sex stereotyping in part
through comments made by the partners, courts often focus
closely on whether gender stereotyping remarks were made by
the defendant. Some courts will treat the absence of such
remarks as an absolute barrier to maintaining a Title VII claim
based on sex stereotyping.
The court in Dillon v. Frank230 provides an example. The
plaintiff claimed he was a victim of sex stereotyping in that he
was not "macho" enough for his co-workers. 211 The court rejected
the claim because there was no evidence that Dillon's co-workers
had made any remarks "indicating[] a belief that his practices
would be acceptable in a female but unacceptable in a male."232
Similarly, in Johnson v. Hondo,233 the court pointed to the
plaintiffs failure to show that the defendant "exhibited hostility"
to the way the plaintiff expressed his gender or sexuality when it
held that the plaintiff failed to create an issue of fact on the
gender stereotyping claim.23 4
When sex stereotyping remarks are made, the plaintiff has
an easier time showing that sex discrimination has occurred. In
Doe, the defendant's gender stereotyping remarks were seen as
conclusive proof that the harassment of the plaintiff was
"because of sex."2 The defendant had asked the plaintiff, "Are
you a boy or girl?" thus suggesting that the harassment was
based on the plaintiffs gender nonconforming characteristics.236
Likewise in Schwenk, the court relied on the harasser's sarcastic
offer to bring the plaintiff "girl stuff" to make her look more
survive a motion to dismiss, but more is certainly needed to avoid summary judgment.
See Shermer v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 171 F.3d 475, 478 (holding that the sex stereotyping
claim must fail on summary judgment because plaintiff "produced no evidence other than
the allegations in his complaint").
230. No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
231. Id. at *5.
232. Id. at *9.
233. 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997).
234. Id. at 413-14.
235. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 163 F.3d 563, 581 (7th Cir. 1997).
236. Id.
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feminine as evidence that the harassment was based at least
partially on gender.23 7
At the very least, then, remarks or other conduct by a
harasser that explicitly question the victim's masculinity or
femininity can go a long way toward showing that* sex
stereotyping took place. Furthermore, it is possible that some
courts will view such remarks as the only valid evidence of
gender stereotyping and will dismiss the claim in the absence of
sex stereotyping remarks. There is no reason, however, that this
should be the only way a plaintiff can show sex stereotyping. 238
Although the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse pointed to
statements of partners in the firm, there is nothing in the
opinion to indicate that one could not prove sex stereotyping by
other methods. Many courts since Price Waterhouse have so
acknowledged.
b. Use of Anti-Gay Epithets and Other Gay-
Specific Harassment
Although all courts agree that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation, courts do not agree
upon what effect harassment specifically targeting an employee's
real or perceived homosexuality will have on a plaintiffs claim.
Some courts have treated any behavior by the defendant
that could be characterized as anti-gay (rather than anti-male or
anti-female) as fatal to a Title VII claim. Dillon provides a
typical example of this. In Dillon, the harasser called Dillon "a
fag" and taunted him by saying, "Dillon sucks dicks."239 The
plaintiff argued, however, that he was not in fact gay; therefore,
the harassment was not based on his sexual orientation, but
rather on the fact that he was not "macho" enough. 240 The court
rejected this argument and dismissed Dillon's claim, reasoning
that because the harassment was "directed at demeaning him
237. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000).
238. For instance, in Dillon the plaintiff was harassed with comments such as, "Dillon
sucks dick." Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
Two commentators have argued that evidence of gender stereotyping could come from
the fact that the plaintiff was being harassed for behavior (performing fellatio) that the
defendant considers appropriate for women only. Locke, supra note 19, at 404-05;
Marcosson, supra note 94, at 26.
239. Dillon, 1992 WL 5436, at *1.
240. Id. at *5.
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solely because.., of his alleged homosexuality," Dillon could not
show that he was harassed "because of sex."241
More recently, in Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling
Co.,242 the harasser made explicitly anti-gay remarks ("faggot"),
as well as remarks demeaning the plaintiffs masculinity in
general ("sissy").243 Despite the "sissy" remark, the court
dismissed the possibility that the harassment could have been
based on the plaintiffs gender nonconformity rather than his
sexual orientation and concluded without justification that the
derogatory comments were "clearly targeted at the plaintiffs
sexual orientation."2 44
Sometimes a court will go even further and characterize
harassment as anti-gay, even though no explicit references to
homosexuality were made. In Sarff v. Continental Express, 245 for
example, part of the harassment the plaintiff received involved
putting earrings in his mailbox at work and cutting out pictures
from Cosmopolitan and Vogue and placing them on his desk.246
Although the plaintiff had framed his claim as one of sex
discrimination only, the court found it was "indisputable" that
the sexual harassment was actually based on homophobia. 247
In stark contrast to these holdings, there are some courts
that, far from using evidence of explicitly anti-gay harassment to
dismiss Title VII claims, have actually stated that anti-gay
harassment can itself be used as evidence to show that the
defendant has engaged in sex stereotyping. Again, the leading
case is Doe. The Doe court recognized that "a homophobic
epithet like 'fag' may be as much a disparagement of a man's
241. Id. at *7; see also Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d
701, 703-07 (7th Cir. 2000) (dismissing Title VII case because the court found that the
harassment was because of sexual orientation, not sex). In Hamner, the plaintiff was an
openly gay male nurse whose supervisor harassed him by "lisping at him, flipping his
wrists, and making jokes about homosexuals." Id. at 703. The plaintiff argued that this
constituted sex discrimination because the harassment was "specifically intimidating to
men and their manhood, but not women." Id. at 707. The court rejected this argument,
stating that it was clear that the harassment was based on the plaintiffs sexual
orientation rather than his sex. Id.
242. 85 F. Supp. 2d 509 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
243. Id. at 511-12.
244. Id. at 517.
245. 894 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
246. Id. at 1079.
247. Id. at 1081; see also Dandan v. Radisson Hotel Lisle, No. 97-C8342, 2000 WL
336528, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2000) (reaching a similar conclusion). In that case, an
employee was called "fagboy," "fruitcake," and "Tinkerbell," among other names. Id. at
*1. Again, the court concluded that "the only reasonable inference" was that the
comments were based on the co-workers' perception of the plaintiffs homosexuality. Id
at *4.
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perceived effeminate qualities as it is of his perceived sexual
orientation."2 4  More recently, Spearman v. Ford Motor Co. 249
strengthened Doe's holding by recognizing that "continuing
comments on an individual's sexual orientation" alone could
create a hostile environment under Title VII. 250  Although both
the Spearman and Doe courts acknowledged that Title VII does
not recognize claims based on sexual orientation, they noted that
discrimination can be based on more than one motive.251  It
follows that just because part of a harasser's motivation is based
on the employee's real or perceived sexual orientation, this does
not preclude a finding that his/her sex did not also play a role.25 2
Furthermore, as Doe noted, there is much overlap between
homophobia and sex discrimination and it is not always possible
to separate the two.253
There are several positions courts take that fall between
those in Dillon and Doe. For instance, some courts may decide
that anti-gay harassment neither defeats nor supports a Title
VII claim.254 Others have decided that the existence of anti-gay
epithets does not automatically defeat a claim under Title VII,
248. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 593 (7th Cir. 1997); accord Carrasco v.
Lenox Hill Hosp., 99 CIV 927(AGS), 2000 WL 520640, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2000)
(holding that an issue of fact existed over whether harassment by co-workers insinuating
that the plaintiff was gay was based on sexual orientation or sex).
249. No. 98-C0452, 1999 WL 754568 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1999).
250. Id. at *6 n.4; accord Patterson v. CBS, Inc., No. 94 CIV 2562 KTD, 2000 WL
666337, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2000) (holding that male plaintiff, who had been called
derogatory names relating to homosexuality and who received a card with a naked man
on it, may have been subjected to a hostile work environment under Title VII);
Breitenfeld v, Long Prairie, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176 (D. Minn. 1999) (suggesting
that when sexual harassment includes "frequent references to homosexual acts," an
inference is created that gender was at least one motivating factor of the harasser);
Samborski v. W. Valley Nuclear Servs. Co., No. 99-CV00213E(M), 1999 WL 1293351, at
*4 (W.D.N.Y Nov. 24, 1999) (suggesting that harassment based on sexual orientation is
often a pretext for sex discrimination).
251. Doe, 119 F.3d at 594 ("The fact that one motive was permissible does not
exonerate the employer from liability under Title VII; the employee can still prevail so
long as she shows that her sex played a motivating role in the employer's decision.").
252. Id. at 593.
253. Id. at 593 n.27; see also Robert Brookins, A Rose by Any Other Name . . . The
Gender Basis of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 441, 513 (1998)
(arguing that most harassment based on sexual orientation is also based on gender).
Therefore, if a defendant wants to avoid liability by asserting that the harassment was
really based on anti-gay bias rather than gender bias, the defendant should have the
burden of separating out the two kinds of discrimination. Id. But see Hamner v. St.
Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 224 F.3d 701, 704-07 (7th Cir. 2000) (denying that
sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination are linked).
254. E.g., Schmedding v. Tnemec, Inc., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999); Quick v.
Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996); Blake v. Grede Foundries, Inc. No. 96-
1322-JTM, 1997 WL 157126, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 1997).
20001 ill
112 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 7:67
but that the plaintiff will have to produce evidence that the
underlying motivation was gender bias, not animus toward
gays.2 55
Oncale would appear to support the argument that, at the
very least, harassment that includes gay-baiting does not
automatically defeat a claim. Although the Oncale decision did
not explicitly address this issue, gay epithets were part of the
harassment the plaintiff in Oncale received 256 and the Court did
not suggest such taunts would prevent the plaintiff from
-succeeding on his claim.
c. Was the Plaintiff Gay or Only Perceived to Be
Gay?
Another factor that may influence courts in cases where gay
epithets were used is whether the victim had identified
him/herself to co-workers as gay. A number of courts have held
that whether anti-gay harassment is based on an employee's
actual or perceived homosexuality is irrelevant to the plaintiffs
claim.257 Some courts have used the fact that the plaintiff was
not openly gay as an indication that the harassment was based
on gender nonconformity.258  The reasoning behind this
conclusion is straightforward. If an employee is being harassed
for being gay, yet never identified himself as such, what would
be the basis for co-workers to conclude that the employee was in
fact homosexual? The obvious answer to this is that co-workers
labeled the employee as gay because he exhibited gender
nonconforming characteristics. 259 Following this logic, the court
in Spearman v. Ford Motor Co. 261 held that, even though.
harassment against an employee included comments suggesting
the Victim was gay, since the victim had never identified himself
255. See Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 509, 517 (E.D. Pa.
2000); Metzger v. Compass Group, U.S.A., Inc., CIV.A. 98-2386-GTV, 1999 WL 714116, at
*8 (D. Kan. Sept. 1, 1999).
256. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998).
257. E.g., Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *8 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992);
Dandan v. Radisson Hotel Lisle, No. 97-C8342, 2000 WL 336528, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28,
2000).
258. Such a conclusion would be consistent with the argument in Part III.B.2 that
anti-gay prejudice has less to do with sexual behavior and more to do with hostility
toward "almost any sign of behavior which does not fit the [gender] stereotype." Fajer,
supra note 132, at 607.
259. See Capers, supra note 94, at 1181 n.101.
260. No. 98-C0452, 1999 WL 754568 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1999).
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as gay to his co-workers, 261 such harassment must have been
based upon the co-workers' perception of the plaintiff "as a man"
rather than on his sexual orientation.262  Also, the court in
Carrasco v. Lenox Hill Hospital26 noted that, because the
harasser knew the victim was married, this made it more likely
that the harassment was based on sex rather than sexual
orientation. 264
The case law suggests that a plaintiff who has received anti-
gay harassment is more likely to succeed on a Title VII claim if
he is either straight or simply does not give any indication of his
sexual orientation. Supporting this view is the fact that in all
the Title VII cases involving anti-gay harassment where the
plaintiff successfully avoided a motion to dismiss or a motion for
summary judgment, a significant proportion of those plaintiffs
identified themselves as heterosexual or were silent about their
sexual orientation.265
d. Comparative Evidence That Employees of
Opposite-Sex with the Same Characteristic Would Not Have
Received Same Treatment
What some courts tend to find most compelling-and what
they often find lacking in Title VII claims by gay plaintiffs-is
evidence that a "similarly situated" member of the opposite sex
did not receive the same adverse treatment that the plaintiff did.
Although all courts in the abstract would accept evidence of
disparate treatment among the sexes as evidence that
discrimination was "because of sex," the analysis becomes
complicated when gay or perceived to be gay employees are
involved.
261. Id. at *4. The court did not treat as relevant whether or not the plaintiff actually
was gay, but only considered whether the plaintiff had told co-workers that he was.
262. Id. at *6.
263. 99 CIV. 927(AGS), 2000 WL 520640 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2000).
264. Id. at *8; see also Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d
701, 707 n.5 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that the plaintiff could have survived summary
judgment if he had introduced evidence that his harasser perceived him as gay because
he was a male nurse).
265. See Schmedding v. Tnemec, Inc., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999); Doe v. City of
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir. 1997); Quick v. Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372, 1374 n.1
(8th Cir. 1996); Carassco, 2000 WL 520640, at *2; Fry v. Holmes Freight Lines, Inc. 72 F.
Supp. 2d 1074, 1077 (W.D. Mo. 1999); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, 919 F. Supp. 351,
354 (D. Nev. 1996).
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For instance, as argued in Part III.B.1, anti-gay
discrimination should always be considered sex stereotyping
because, for example, if a lesbian is fired because her employer
disapproves of the fact that she is sexually attracted to women,
it would almost invariably have not treated a man who was
sexually attracted to women in the same adverse way. Many
courts, however, insist on applying the test in a less
straightforward manner.
The court in Dillon v. Frank took a very narrow view of the
meaning of "similarly situated."26 Rather than require that the
male plaintiff show that a woman would not have been adversely
treated, the court held that he would have to show that a
similarly situated lesbian would have been treated differently
(even though the plaintiff never acknowledged being gay).267
Under this view, as long as an employer harasses both gender
nonconforming males and gender nonconforming females, there
is no sex discrimination. 268
This rigid view of the type of comparative evidence that is
needed contradicts the Supreme Court's holding in Price
Waterhouse.269 In that case there was no requirement that Ann
Hopkins show that only women with gender nonconforming
characteristics were discriminated against while gender
nonconforming men were accepted.
266. Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *9 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992); see
also Hamner, 224 F.3d at 707 n.5 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that a gay plaintiff could
prevail by showing that gay male nurses but not lesbian nurses were discriminated
against).
267. Dillon, 1992 WL 5436, at *9. One district court in the early 1980s suggested that
even if a plaintiff could show disparate treatment of female versus male homosexuals,
she still might not have a claim under Title VII since sexual orientation is probably not
an "immutable characteristic," and therefore any distinction made on this basis would be
permissible under Title VII. Valdes v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 507 F. Supp. 10, 12-
13 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
268. Even courts who have ruled favorably for gender nonconforming plaintiffs have
taken this view. In Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000), an
individual who was biologically male, but was dressed in traditionally feminine attire,
sued a bank under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) for refusing to give her a
loan application. Id. at 214. Like Title VII, the ECOA prohibits discrimination because
of sex. Id. at 215. In addition, Title VII principles and precedent are used to interpret
the ECOA. See id.
In Rosa, the First Circuit denied the bank's motion to dismiss because it stated it
was possible that "Rosa did not receive the loan application because he was a man,
whereas a similarly situated woman would have received the loan application." Id. at
215-26. The court went on to state that disparate treatment would be shown if"a woman
who dresses like a man [is treated] differently than a man who dresses like a woman."
Id. at 215-16. Like Dillon, this case suggests that if the bank discriminated against
both "men who dress like women" and "women who dress like men," then in the First
Circuit's view, there would be no sex discrimination. Id.
269. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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The more faithful interpretation of Price Waterhouse was
taken by Doe. The Doe court held that disparate treatment
between the sexes could be shown by asking: if a member of the
opposite sex had the same trait(s) as the plaintiff, would he still
have been treated badly927 0  This is the same question that
courts have asked in all other types of Title VII sex
discrimination claims, and there is no principled rationale for
why a different standard should be applied simply because the
plaintiff is, or is perceived to be, gay.
Furthermore, as in Price Waterhouse, this showing of
disparate treatment does not necessarily have to be made
through direct comparative evidence. 271 Instead it can simply be
inferred from the fact that an employee was harassed for having
a trait that does not conform to gender stereotypes and that
members of the opposite sex with the same trait would not
generally be treated adversely. 72
Finally, Oncale suggests that direct comparative evidence is
not needed at all. While comparative evidence is one way to
create an inference of sex discrimination, it is certainly not the
only wayY 3  Furthermore, it is important to note that Ann
Hopkins, the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, did not have to make
such a showing. The fact that her employer had made sex
stereotyping remarks was sufficient to enable the fact finder to
draw the inference that the discrimination was based on sex.2 7 '
e. Evidence That Plaintiff Actually Possesses
Gender Nonconforming Traits
A necessary, although probably not sufficient, element of
proving that discrimination was due to the employee's gender
nonconformity is that the plaintiff does in fact express her
270. See Doe, 119 F.3d at 581.
271. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231.
272. Doe, 119 F.3d at 581-82 ("One need only consider for a moment whether [the
plaintiff'si gender would have been questioned for wearing an earring ... if he were a
woman rather than a man."); Carrasco v. Lenox Hill Hosp., No. 99 CIV. 927(AGS), 2000
WL 520640, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2000) (noting that sexually harassing comments to
male employee for perceived homosexuality could be based on sex because female
employees "were likely not exposed" to same comments).
Another way that sex stereotyping could be proven by gay plaintiffs would be to
introduce evidence that stereotypically masculine gay men or stereotypically feminine
lesbians were not subject to the same adverse treatment. This would demonstrate that
the discrimination was based on gender nonconformity rather than sexual orientation.
To the authors' knowledge, this method of proof has not been tried before.
273. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serve., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
274. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234.
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gender in a nonconforming way. Making this showing could be
crucial in situations where the harassment itself is ambiguous
regarding its specific motive. For instance, in cases in which the
harasser uses anti-gay epithets, it will be much more difficult for
a factfinder to infer that such harassment is based on sex
stereotypes rather than sexual orientation if there is no evidence
that, aside from being gay, the employee actually is gender
nonconforming. 7 1 When this showing can be made, some courts
have assumed that the gender nonconforming behavior would be
considered acceptable if it was exhibited by members of the
opposite sex and that it was, in fact, the motivation for the
discriminatory conduct. For instance, in Doe, the court referred
to the plaintiffs wearing of an earring to provide the inference
that he was harassed for failing to meet his "co-workers' idea of
how men are to appear and behave"-even though no comments
were made explicitly regarding the plaintiff's earring.276 In
Schwenk, the court partially relied on the fact that the plaintiff
was a biological male with a feminine appearance to conclude
that her harassment was due to the defendant's belief that the
plaintiff was a man who "failed to act like" one. 277
The simple fact that an employee is in an occupation
traditionally held by members of the opposite sex can also be a
gender nonconforming characteristic that provides an inference
of sex discrimination. In Samborski v. West Valley Nuclear
Services Co.,278 the plaintiff, a woman working in a mostly male
facility, was assumed to be a lesbian and then harassed.279 In
rejecting the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs claim was
based on sexual orientation, not sex, the court stated, '"[Ilt takes
no leap of logic to infer that [because of] of the traditionally male
oriented nature of plaintiffs work in a work' area dominated by
male employees, such alleged treatment may have been based on
her sex."280  The same inference can be made for men in a
275. For example, in Simonton v. Runyon, No. 99-6180, 2000 WL 1575481 (2d Cir.
Aug. 22, 2000), the plaintiff attempted to argue for the first time on appeal that a gay
postal worker's harassment was based on gender nonconformity, not on sexual
orientation. See id. at **4-5. Although noting that "Price Waterhouse implied that a suit
alleging harassment or disparate treatment based upon nonconformity with sexual
stereotypes is cognizable under Title VII," the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs
claim because he had pled no facts that he was gender nonconforming. See id. at *5.
276. Doe, 119 F.3d at 581.
277. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000).
278. No. 99-CV00213E(M), 1999 WL 1293351 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1999).
279. Id. at *1.
280. Id. at *4 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Note that Ann Hopkins, the
plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, was also a female in a traditionally male occupation. Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231 (1989).
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traditionally female occupation who are subject to
discrimination. In Blake v. Grede Foundries, Inc., 28 the plaintiff
was a male receptionist whose co-workers harassed him with
taunts such as, "Where's your purse?" and "Where's your skirt
and pantyhose?" as well as gestures suggesting that Blake was
gay.28 2 The court found that this was enough to state a claim for
sex discrimination. 83
Not all courts, however, are willing to infer from an
employee's gender nonconforming characteristics that the
discrimination he receives is "because of sex" stereotyping.
Again, Dillon provides an example. Dillon argued that he was
discriminated against because he was not sufficiently
masculine.2 84 The court held that even though the plaintiff may
have been gender nonconforming, he was required to produce
additional evidence that the harassment he received was based
on his gender nonconforming characteristics. 285 This suggests
that, although it is important to stress the gender
nonconforming characteristics of an employee, this in itself may
not be enough to show that the discrimination was in fact based
on sex stereotyping. 286
281. No. 96-1322-JTM, 1997 WL 157126 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 1997).
282. Id. at *1.
283. Id. at *3. But see Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d
701, 708 (7th Cir. 2000) (denying same sex harassment claim brought by male nurse).
The court in Hamner did note, however, that if the plaintiff had presented evidence that
the defendant had disapproved of men being in the nursing profession* and harassed
them because of this, then the plaintiff could show that he was discriminated against
because of sex. See id. at 707 n.5. This footnote in Hamner seems to keep the door open
for gender nonconformity claims in the Seventh Circuit. If the plaintiff can make a
strong showing that he was discriminated against because he was gender nonconforming
(e.g. being a male in a mostly female profession) rather than just because he was gay, he
still has a claim. This shows the importance of how a claim is framed at the pleading
stage.
284. Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *9 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
285. Id.
286. It should be noted further that some courts have held that not all disparate
treatment based on gender nonconforming characteristics is impermissible under Title
VII. The most prominent example involves grooming requirements. Both the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and the Eastern District of New York have held that an
employer policy forbidding men, but not women, from wearing earrings is permissible
under Title VII. See Kleinsorge v. Eyeland Corp., No. CIV. A. 99-5025, 2000 WL 124559,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2000); Capaldo v. Pan Am. Fed. Credit Union, No. 86-CV1944,
1987 WL 9687, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1987). The courts' rationale for allowing such
policies is that Title VII does not prohibit "'minor differences in personal appearance
regulations that reflect customary modes of grooming.' See Kleinsorge, 2000 WL
124559, at *2 (quoting Knott v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975)).
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, it also has not stated
that some sex-based distinctions are prohibited and some are not. Furthermore,
distinguishing between "major' and "minor" sex discrimination goes against the Supreme
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2. Other Methods of Proving Discrimination 'Because of
Sex"
Although proving sex stereotyping is probably a gay
plaintiffs best chance of succeeding on a Title VII claim, it is not
the only potential method for proving that there has been
discrimination "because of sex." Other ways that courts have
allowed plaintiffs to create an inference of sex discrimination
include showing that the adverse treatment was (1) of a sexually
explicit nature, 287 (2) based on sexual desire,2s  (3) part of an
Court's prior reflections that Title VII prohibits the "entire spectrum" of disparate
treatment between men and women. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75, 78 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989); Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64
(1986).
Regardless of the soundness of the courts' rulings that different grooming
standards for men and women are allowed under Title VII, gender nonconforming
plaintiffs should be aware that even in jurisdictions where sex stereotyping has been
broadly defined, a court may nonetheless hold that such stereotyping is permissible
because it only involves "a minor difference in personal appearance."
287. Prior to Oncale, some courts held that it could be presumed that any explicit
sexual harassment, regardless of the genders of the harasser and victim, was
discrimination because of sex. E.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 579 (7th Cir.
1997) ("[Tlhe explicitly sexual harassment of a female amounts to sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII . . . because her employment is now conditioned upon her
willingness to endure harassment that is inseparable from her gender.").
Across the board adoption of this view by courts would no doubt be extremely
helpful to gay Title VII plaintiffs. If the number of cases is any indication, discrimination
against gay men often takes the form of sexual harassment and is usually perpetrated by
other men. This makes establishing a prima facie case under Title VII much more
difficult, as many courts refuse to rule that harassment of a male employee by another
male employee could be "because of sex." However, this hurdle does not have to be
overcome if the "because of sex" inference can be proven by the nature of the harassment
itself.
Unfortunately, this view was rejected by the Supreme Court in Oncale when it
stated that harassment is not "because of sex" "merely because the words used have
sexual content or connotations." Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. Therefore, after Oncale, the
argument that harassment that is sexual in nature is always "because of sex" is probably
no longer viable. Courts taking this position prior to Oncale have since modified it in an
attempt to remain consistent with the Supreme Court. For example, in Shepherd v.
Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999), the court held that although Title VII
does not prohibit harassment that is simply vulgar or sexual, the context of the sexual
harassment could show that the "sexual overlay was not incidental." Id. at 1011. The
Shepherd court was not explicit on how this determination would be made, but concluded
that the facts in the present case, which included the harasser exposing himself to the
plaintiff and "rubbling] himself' into an erection while threatening to sexually assault
the plaintiff, would allow a fact finder to infer that the plaintiff could have been harassed
because he was a man. Id.
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environment that is hostile to an entire sex,289 or (4) inflicted
solely on one gender.2s9 As with gender stereotyping, courts have
taken a range of positions on the availability of these methods,
particularly when the plaintiff is, or is perceived to be, gay.
288. Oncale suggested that one way to support an inference of discrimination on the
basis of sex when the harasser is of the same sex as the victim would be to show that the
harasser was homosexual. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. This method of proof theoretically
should be open to both straight and gay victims of same-sex harassment. Furthermore,
some courts have suggested that if there is any evidence at all that same-sex harassment
was based on sexual desire, summary judgment on a Title VII claim is improper. Fry v.
Holmes Freight Lines, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1076 (W.D. Mo. 1999). Potentially,
then, a gay plaintiff who was subject to explicit sexual harassment could at least get past
summary judgment by alleging that his harasser was also gay.
This strategy is not always successful. See Johnson v. Hondo, 125 F.3d 408, 413
(7th Cir. 1997) (holding that mere allegation of a harasser's homosexuality is not enough
to create an inference of sex discrimination). Even if such a strategy would always be a
successful way to survive summary judgment, it would certainly be far from the most
desirable. Arguing that same-sex harassment is based on sexual desire has been said to
only encourage anti-gay prejudice (by depicting gay people as sexual harassers). In
addition, it prevents the usage of other theories (such as sex stereotyping) that would be
more consistent with gays' long term goals regarding Title VII interpretation.
289. Some courts before Oncale held that only same-sex harassment based on sexual
desire was actionable under Title -VII, but others held that an employee could only
maintain a cause of action under Title VII against a member of the same sex if he/she
could show that there existed a workplace environment hostile to the plaintiff's entire
sex. E.g., Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. II. 1988). Although Oncale
made clear that a plaintiff in a Title VII case is not required to show an anti-male or
anti-female environment, this is still one approach that a plaintiff could take in showing
that his/her discrimination was because of sex. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
Such a showing could be made plausibly by a lesbian plaintiff as courts have
acknowledged that anti-gay harassment directed at women is likely to be a pretext for
sex discrimination. For a gay male plaintiff, however, particularly in an all, or mostly
all, male environment, this showing would be almost impossible to make since the
harassers themselves are generally male and would be of limited usefulness to gay
plaintiffs asserting Title VII claims.
290. In sexual harassment cases, an inference of sex discrimination can sometimes be
created simply by an allegation that members of the opposite sex were not subject to the
same adverse treatment. See Quick v. Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996).
The same would be true for gay and lesbian employees; if they can show that only one
sex was harassed, then this may be enough to suggest that the plaintiff was singled out
because of her sex. See Carrasco v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 99 CIV.A.927(AGS), 2000 WL
520640, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2000) (stating that comments made by co-workers
suggesting that the plaintiff was gay were comments to which female employees "were
not likely exposed").
Some courts, however, have stated that evidence that members of only one sex
are being subjected to harassment is not sufficient to show that the discrimination was
"because of sex" when the work environment is all, or mostly all, male or female. E.g.
Klein v. McGowan, 36 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889 (D. Minn. 1999). Several justices during oral
argument for Oncale made similar comments. See Oral Argument, supra note 218. In
unisex environments, this evidentiary route could be closed off to gay plaintiffs.
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What is important to remember in all Title VII cases is that
there is no one way to prove sex discrimination; any admissible
evidence that would allow a reasonable fact finder to infer that
the discrimination was "because of sex" is sufficient. Although
Oncale cited examples of methods that plaintiffs could use to
create the inference, it did not state that these were the only
methods that could be used.29' Courts have interpreted Oncale
as providing an illustrative, rather than exhaustive, list of
evidentiary routes.2 92
D. A Note on Severity
Plaintiffs asserting "hostile environment" sexual
harassment claims under Title VII not only have to show that
the harassment was "because of sex," but also that it was
sufficiently severe or pervasive so that it objectively alters the
terms or conditions of employment.293 Although this issue is not
directly related to whether gay plaintiffs in general can bring
Title VII claims, a court's view of what is "sufficiently severe and
pervasive" can be an additional barrier to succeeding on the
merits.
As Oncale noted, Title VII is not a civility code for the
workplace. 29' Accordingly, many forms of harassment will not be
covered by the statute.295 For instance, "simple teasing" about
an employee's homosexuality or gender nonconforming
characteristics may not be sufficiently hostile to be actionable
under Title VII.m Even in courts that consider anti-gay
291. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 ("Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to
follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue . . . constituted
'discrimin[ation] ... because of... sex.' (emphasis added) (alteration in original)).
292. See Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 1009 (noting that Oncale's recitation of three possible
methods of showing discrimination because of sex was instructive not exhaustive);
Schmedding v. Tnemec, Inc., 187 F.3d 862, 865 n.4 (8th Cir. 1999) (same). But see Mims
v. Carrier Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 706, 715 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
293. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-69 (1986). Obviously, in a
disparate treatment case where the employee was terminated, denied a promotion, etc.,
the plaintiff need not show that the discrimination was severe or pervasive.
294. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
295. Id.; Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (stating that an offensive
epithet is not enough to create a hostile environment).
296. See Mims, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 717 (holding that jokes about male plaintiff being in
bed with another male not pervasive or severe enough to be actionable under Title VII);
Metzger v. Compass Group U.S.A., Inc., No. CIV.A.98-2386-GTV, 1999 WL 714116, at *9
(D. Kan. Sept. 1, 1999) (holding that a comment to female plaintiff by male supervisor
telling her to "suck his dick" not severe enough to create a hostile environment); Klein v.
McGowan, 36 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889 (D. Minn. 1999) (holding that statements by
20001 EN/GENDERING EQUALITY
harassment a form of gender stereotyping, "crude and offensive"
comments about an employee's sexual orientation may not create
a hostile environment. 297 Plaintiffs who received any kind of
physical abuse, however, should not have difficulty in satisfying
this requirement, as courts have generally assumed that all
environments of this type are hostile for the purposes of Title
VII.298
E. Litigation Challenges
As the above analysis demonstrates, there is little
consistency among courts in Title VII cases, particularly in those
cases involving homosexuality. There are vast differences both
among the circuits 299 and within individual circuits 3°° in the
treatment of gay, or perceived to be gay, plaintiffs. Individual
judges have even failed to be consistent with themselves. 30 1
These inconsistencies make it difficult to predict how any one
defendant calling plaintiff "homo," telling plaintiff "if I ever find out you're queer, I'll fire
you," and expelling flatulence into plaintiff's workspace not severe and pervasive).
297. Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-C0452, 1999 WL 754568, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 9, 1999) (holding that comments directed at plaintiff threatening to "fuck (his] little
gay ass up," calling him a "fucking jag-off pussy ass," and commenting that plaintiff was
gay and had AIDS over a two-year period not sufficiently hostile to be actionable under
Title VII). Furthermore, if and when more gay plaintiffs are able to sustain claims under
Title VII, this issue could become increasingly important because claims by heterosexual
women are often thrown out for failing to be based on harassment sufficiently hostile.
298. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 257-58 (1st Cir. 1999)
(finding that hostile environment was created where plaintiff had hot cement poured on
him and was shaken violently); Quick v. Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that employee who claimed defendant grabbed his testicles daily created an
issue of fact regarding whether harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive);
Patterson v. CBS, Inc., No. 94 CIV. 2562 KTD, 2000 WL 666337, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 22,
2000) ("[Hlumiliating sexual touching coupled with... sexual remarks could support a
conclusion that the environment was hostile."); Breitenfeld v. Long Prairie Packing Co.,
48 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176 (D. Minn. 1999) (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude
that a hostile environment was created where plaintiff was subjected to "painful physical
assault on [his] genitalia); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 582 (7th Cir. 1997)
(finding hostile environment was created where plaintiff was grabbed by testicles).
299. Compare Doe, 119 F.3d at 607 (holding that sexual harassment of a man by
another man is actionable under Title VII), with Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL
5436, at *7 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 1992) (holding that Title VII does not cover verbal
harassment aimed at homosexuals).
300. Compare Dandan v. Radisson Hotel Lisle, No. 97-C8342, 2000 WL 336528, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2000), with Spearman, 1999 WL 754568 at *9.
301. Compare Klein, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 890 (holding that comments directed at
homosexuality could not be "because of sex" under Title VII), with Breitenfeldt, 48 F.
Supp. 2d at 1175 (holding that comments directed at homosexual behavior were evidence
that harassment was "because of... sex" under Title VII).
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court will rule in the future on these cases with any degree of
certainty.
Having made that caveat, however, courts in general have
exhibited various trends that allow gay plaintiffs to determine
their chances of success and adjust their litigation strategies so
that their chances are maximized.
1. Characterize Claim as Being Based on Sex Stereotyping
Rather Than Sexual Orientation
No other piece of advice can be stressed more heavily for gay
plaintiffs bringing claims under Title VII than to emphasize the
sex stereotyping theory as much as possible and de-emphasize
any connection that the discrimination has to homosexuality.
Identifying as gay significantly decreases a plaintiffs chance of
success because courts have a tendency to mischaracterize all
Title VII claims brought by openly gay plaintiffs as being based
on sexual orientation rather than sex.302
First, the complaint itself should allege discrimination
"because of sex," not sexual orientation. If the complaint alleges
sexual orientation, the suit will be unlikely to survive even a
motion to dismiss; even circuits that are generally accepting of
sex stereotyping claims will not recognize a Title VII claim based
explicitly on sexual orientation. 30 3  At the pleading stage,
however, little more than an allegation of sex discrimination
should be required.30 4
Second, both at the pleading stage and beyond, gay plaintiffs
should cite to Price Waterhouse, using that decision to the
greatest extent possible to frame their argument. By comparing
the treatment received by the plaintiff to that treatment the
Supreme Court condemned in Price Waterhouse, lower courts
will have much greater difficulty in simply dismissing the claim
as being based on sexual orientation rather than sex.
Specifically, gay plaintiffs should argue that they were
302. See Gross, supra note 98, at 1207 n.220.
303. The importance of framing the complaint around a sex stereotyping theory
cannot be over-emphasized. In two recent courts of appeals decisions, the courts
indicated that they were open to sex stereotyping claims brought by gay plaintiffs, but
ultimately denied the claim because the plaintiff had not presented the argument at the
district level. See Simonton v. Runyon, No. 99-6180, 2000 WL 1575481, at **4-5 (2d Cir.
Oct. 23, 2000); Higgins, 194 F.3d at 259-60.
304. See Samborski v. W. Valley Nuclear Servs. Co., No. 99-CV00213E(M), 1999 WL
1293351, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1999) ("[At the pleading stage], Title VII demands only
that a plaintiff present a plausible legal theory, backed by significantly probative
evidence.").
EN/GENDERING EQUALITY
discriminated against for the way they expressed their
masculinity or femininity. °5 In addition to relying on Price
Waterhouse, gay plaintiffs should emphasize that nothing in
Oncale has detracted from Price Waterhouse or put limitations
on the types of impermissible sex stereotyping.
Finally, gay plaintiffs should present as much evidence as
possible indicating they were gender nonconforming and that
their employer was motivated to discriminate against them
because of their nonconformity. This includes any comments
(e.g. "Are you a boy or girl?") or other conduct that expresses
hostility toward the way the employee expresses his/her gender.
At the same time, plaintiffs generally should not rely on any
behavior by the employer specifically targeting homosexuality
for support.0 6
2. Argue Against Congressional Intent
Gay plaintiffs suing under Title VII should use Oncale and
other Supreme Court decisions to emphasize that congressional
intent does not prevent courts from recognizing Title VII claims
of gender nonconformists. Specifically, plaintiffs should refer to
the expansive interpretations the Supreme Court has given to
congressional intent, where the majority stated that Title VII is
meant to protect "all individuals,"30 7 that it creates "a broad rule
of workplace equality,"305 and that its purpose is to eliminate the
"entire spectrum" of sex discrimination. 30 9 Oncale, in particular,
should be cited to show that Title VII covers all "comparable
evils" to those that were the original target of the statute, and
that ultimately, it is the language of the statute that controls,
305. Emphasizing gender nonconformity over sexual orientation also allows
sympathetic courts, that are nonetheless wary of defying the judicial trend of rejecting
Title VII claims based on sexual orientation, to find in favor of gay plaintiffs. Because
legislation that would explicitly prohibit employment discrimination has been rejected by
Congress in the past, some courts do not want to interpret Title VII in a way that they
believe would "boostrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII." Simonton, 2000
WL 1575481, at *5. Adopting a sex stereotyping theory that would protect only
stereotypically feminine gay men or stereotypically masculine lesbians allows these
courts to interpret Title VII somewhat expansively without appearing as if they are re-
writing a statute.
306. The exception to the rule against relying on anti-gay harassment to support a sex
stereotyping claim would be bringing suit in the Seventh Circuit. That circuit has held
that anti-gay harassment can be evidence that sex discrimination has occurred under
Title VII. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 593 (7th Cir. 1997).
307. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 681 (1983).
308. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
309. E.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78, (1998).
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not the specific intent of Congress.310 Furthermore, because Price
Waterhouse adopted a "gender approach" to interpreting sex, the
prohibitions of Title VII should extend to discrimination based
on any expression of masculinity or femininity and should not be
restricted to biological distinctions only.
3. Prospects for Lesbians Versus Gay Men
Since the Supreme Court first recognized sex stereotyping
claims in Price Waterhouse, lower courts generally have been
much more open to claims brought by gender nonconforming
women than gender nonconforming men.3 1 1 There could be
several reasons for this dynamic.
First, it could simply be that because the plaintiff in Price
Waterhouse was female, courts are more likely to see as similar
other sex stereotyping claims brought by women rather than
men. Women are also more likely to be caught in a catch-
twenty-two situation that the Price Waterhouse Court referred
to, in which women are penalized for possessing the very
qualities upon which their success in a given field is so
dependent.3 12 Decisions after Price Waterhouse have alluded to
this aspect of the case to distinguish it from claims brought by
gender noncomforming men.313
Another reason could be that since discrimination against
women is more pervasive than discrimination against men,
judges are simply more willing to believe that discrimination
against gender nonconforming women is indicative of a bias
against women in general.
Legal scholar Mary Anne Case argues that the real reason
behind the double standard is more fundamental than the above
possibilities would suggest.3 14 Case argues that society devalues
qualities associated with women, so male employees who exhibit
traditionally feminine characteristics will be less likely to obtain
Title VII protection.3 15 Specifically, courts are more likely to
310. Id. at 79.
311. For cases where gender nonconforming women have successfully avoided a
motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment or a judgment as a matter of law, see
Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2000); Lindahl v. Air France,
930 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1991); Samborski v. West Valley Nuclear Services Co., No.
99-CV00213E(M), 1999 WL 1293351, at **4-5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1999).
312. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
313. See Dillon v. Frank, No' 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at **9-10 (6th Cir. Jan. 15,
1992).
314. See Case, supra note 31, at 3.
315. Id.
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characterize discrimination against women with masculine
qualities (like the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins) as
sex discrimination, while characterizing discrimination against
men with feminine qualities as sexual orientation
discrimination.3 16
Regardless of the reasoning behind the trend, it suggests
that lesbians may have significantly greater chances for success
in asserting sex stereotyping claims under Title VII than gay
men. Furthermore, gay men will need to take even greater
precautions to prevent their sex discrimination claims from
being recharacterized as sexual orientation claims.
4. The Disparity Among the Circuits
The leanings of a particular judge are difficult to predict,
even within a specific circuit. In fact, there are marked
differences in the approaches various circuits have taken to
gender stereotyping claims. Without a doubt, the Seventh
Circuit is the jurisdiction in which a gay plaintiff is most likely
to prevail. From the beginning of sex stereotyping litigation in
the 1970s, the Seventh Circuit has been the leader in recognizing
that Title VII prohibits the entire spectrum of discrimination
based on sex stereotypes.317 Presently, the Seventh Circuit,
more than any other jurisdiction, has begun to eliminate the
barriers traditionally faced by gay plaintiffs in making Title VII
claims by de-emphasizing congressional intent, interpreting
"sex" to include socially constructed characteristics, and focusing
more on the content of the discrimination rather than the
specific motive. Most important, rather than using anti-gay
epithets as an excuse to dismiss a Title VII claim, as many
courts have done, courts in the Seventh Circuit have generally
held that harassment targeting homosexuality can be used as
evidence that the defendant engaged in sex stereotyping.318 The
First, Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have also, to varying
degrees, fallen in line behind the Seventh Circuit to accept more
claims based on gender stereotyping theories.
316. See id.
317. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
318. The openness of the Seventh Circuit to Title VII claims brought by gay plaintiffs
was diminished somewhat by the recent decision, Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health
Care Ctr., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000). In that case, it interpreted the meaning of "sex"
in Title VII narrowly and denied that sex and sexual orientation discrimination were
related. Id. at 704 (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
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In stark contrast to the Seventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit
has vehemently resisted including any claims under Title VII
that have not already been explicitly recognized. It still views
sex stereotyping claims very narrowly. The Fifth Circuit was
one of the first jurisdictions to reject claims brought by
effeminate men under Title VII 319 and was the only circuit to
categorically deny relief to all plaintiffs alleging same-sex sexual
harassment before the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale.3 20
Courts in the Fifth Circuit still express hostility to gender
stereotyping claims by ignoring Price Waterhouse in cases
involving gender nonconforming plaintiffs and continuing to rely
on precedent from the 1970s which refused to recognize Title VII
claims brought by effeminate men.321 The Fourth and Sixth
circuits also have taken a narrow view of Title VII that will lead
to dismissal of Title VII claims brought by gay plaintiffs.
322
Although plaintiffs may have limited control over the
jurisdiction in which they choose to bring suit, gay plaintiffs
should be aware of their relative chances of success. Whenever
possible, they should file in jurisdictions more accepting of
gender-stereotyping claims.
Even in a best case scenario involving a model plaintiff, it is
extremely unlikely that Title VII will ever provide
comprehensive protection for gays against employment
discrimination. There is no jurisdiction that recognizes a Title
VII claim based explicitly on sexual orientation discrimination.
There is little indication that this will change anytime soon.
Although some gay people, particularly those who are gender
nonconforming, may be able to survive a motion for summary
judgment, there are many more instances in which suits would
be dismissed.
Perhaps just as important to consider, if not more so, are the
means a gay plaintiff will need to use to maximize her chance of
success. Because sexual orientation claims are not recognized,
gay plaintiffs will have to downplay their sexual orientation.
Even if a gay person is successful in his/her claim, the victory
319. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir. 1978).
320. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1994).
321. Mims v. Carrier Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 706, 715 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
322. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195
(4th Cir. 1996) (holding that Title VII only permits same-sex harassment claims where
harasser is gay); Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 5,
1992) (dismissing Title VII claim brought by postal worker perceived to be gay based
partially on view that Congress did not intend Title VII to protect gays from
discrimination and that the meaning of "sex" in statute should be limited to its
"traditional" meaning).
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may be a hollow one if it was won by denying his/her identity.
This may be a price that many gay plaintiffs are unwilling to pay
to get the protection to which they are entitled. It is because of
this and other considerations that Congress must pass
legislation that explicitly prohibits workplace discrimination
based on sexual orientation in order to achieve comprehensive
protection for gay people against workplace discrimination.
V. THE EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION ACT
With dim prospects for persuading courts to expand their
interpretation of Title VII to encompass anti-gay discrimination
within the prohibition of discrimination "because of sex," the
legislative solution is the better one.323 The Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 1999 (ENDA),324 introduced in the 106th
Congress on June 24, 1999, would expressly prohibit
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
325
ENDA defines "sexual orientation" as "heterosexuality,
homosexuality or bisexuality, whether real or perceived."326 In
the 104th Congress, ENDA missed passage in the Senate by one
vote. 327
Patterned after Title VII, ENDA provides that a "covered
entity" cannot, with respect to employment or an employment
opportunity, subject an individual to different standards or
treatment, or otherwise discriminate against the individual, on
the basis of the individual's real or perceived sexual orientation
or that of a person with whom the individual is believed to
323. Courts that have rejected Title VII sexual orientation claims have agreed that
Congress must act. For example, a district court in Maine recently stated:
In determining along with numerous other jurisdictions that Title VII
does not provide a remedy for discrimination based on sexual
orientation, the Court does not in any way condone this serious and
pervasive activity in the American workplace. The intolerable working
conditions set forth in the cases denying relief under Title VII for
rampant discrimination based on sexual orientation call for immediate
remedial response by Congress.
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 76 n.10 (D. Me. 1998)
(emphasis added).
324. H.R. 2355, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1276, 106th Cong. (1999). ENDA was first
introduced in the 103rd Congress. S. 2238, 103rd Cong. (1994); H.R. 4636, 103rd Cong.
(1994).
325. See 140 CONG. REC. S7581 (daily ed. June 23, 1994) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
326. S. 1276, 106th Cong. §3 (1999).
327. John E. Yang, Senate Passes Bill Against Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST, Sept.
11, 1996, at Al ("The Senate overwhelmingly approved legislation yesterday that is
designed to prevent gay marriages ... while narrowly defeating another bill [ENDA] that
would have outlawed job discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.').
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associate. 28 The term "covered entity" includes most federal and
state employers,329 as well as private employers. Covered
private employers are those entities "engaged in an industry
affecting commerce," as defined in section 701(h) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,330 that have fifteen or more employees. 331
ENDA does not apply to the armed forces,3 32 nor to religious
organizations, except regarding employment in a position whose
duties are dedicated solely to generating unrelated business
income subject to federal taxation.333 Moreover, ENDA would
not apply to employee spousal benefits,334 explicitly prohibits
quotas or any preferential treatment on the basis of sexual
orientation,335 prohibits the EEOC from collecting statistics on
sexual orientation from covered entities,336 and affirmatively
disallows disparate impact claims based on a prima facie
violation of the statue.3 37
ENDA has earned widespread endorsements. As of the close
of the 106th Congress, ENDA had 37 Senate co-sponsors
(including 3 Republicans) and 174 House co-sponsors (including
16 Republicans).3 38 President Clinton endorsed ENDA and
committed to sign it into law if it passed Congress during his
administration. 339
Dozens of major corporations, including Apple Computer,
AT&T, Bethlehem Steel, Eastman Kodak, Honeywell, Merrill
Lynch, Microsoft, Prudential Insurance, Quaker Oats, RJR
Nabisco, Verizon and Xerox have endorsed the bill for passage.3 40
A large number of church groups and non-profit organizations
328. S. 1276 106th Cong. § 4 (1999); H.R. 2355 106th Cong. § 4 (1999).
329. S. 1276 § 3 (including government employers encompassed by section 717(a) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2000), section 302(a)(1) of the
Government Employee Rights Act of 1992, 2 U.S.C. § 1202(1) (2000), and the
Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000)); H.R. 2355 § 3 (same).
330. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h).
331. ENDA, S. 1276 §3(3a).
332. Id. § 10(aX1).
333. Id. § 9.
334. Id. § 6.
335. Id. § 8.
336. Id. § 7.
337. Id.
338. Current Legislation, Human Rights Campaign http//congress.nw.dc.us/cgi-
bin/issue.pl?dir =hrc&command=bills (last visited Dec. 4, 2000).
339. See Clinton Backs Bill to Bar Job Bias Against Gays, Ci. TRIB., Oct. 21, 1995, at
8N, 1995 WL 6257712.
340. Corporations Endorsing the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA)
(Human Rights Campaign) http://www.hic.org/worknet (last visited August 20, 2000).
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also have endorsed ENDA.341 Major civil rights figures, such as
Coretta Scott King, have endorsed ENDA. So has former
Senator Barry Goldwater, the conservative luminary, who
reasoned that "[e]mployment discrimination based on sexual
orientation is a real problem in our society. From coast to coast
and throughout the heartland, regular hardworking Americans
are being denied the right to roll up their sleeves and earn a
living. That is just plain wrong."342
ENDA would remedy employment discrimination against
lesbians, gay men and bisexuals, regardless of whether they are
gender nonconforming. At this time, however, ENDA does not
explicitly cover transgendered Americans. Because ENDA would
cover "perceived as" sexual orientation discrimination, it may
provide protection to some transgendered plaintiffs. Many
transgendered Americans are discriminated against because,
they are perceived as being, or actually are, gay, lesbian, or
bisexual.
A number of transgendered activists have argued that
ENDA should not be passed without explicit coverage of
transgendered status or, at minimum, gender identity. These
activists also contend that ENDA in its current form (i.e., not
including gender identity), not only excludes transgendered
Americans from the bill's scope, but also fails to protect gender
nonconforming lesbians and gay men.
In its position paper on ENDA, GenderPAC, a prominent
national organization addressing gender identity issues, argues
that ENDA as currently worded will protect only those
employees fortunate enough to be both gay and gender-
normative, while leaving gender-variant gays, lesbians and
bisexuals, as well as transgender employees, exposed to
substantial risk of workplace discrimination. 343 GenderPAC
341. The American Jewish Committee, the Episcopal Church, the Evangelical
Lutheran Church, the Presbyterian Church (USA), the Union of American Hebrew
Congregations and the United Methodist Church, among others, have endorsed ENDA.
Churches and Religious Organizations Endorsing the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act (ENDA) (Human Rights Campaign) http://www.hrc.org/worknet (last visited August
20, 2000). The American Bar Association, the American Nurses Association, the
American Psychological Association, the AFL-CIO, the National Women's Law Center
and People for the American Way, among others, have endorsed ENDA. See
Organizations Endorsing the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) (Human
Rights Campaign) http://www.hrc.org/worknet. (last visited August 20, 2000).
342. See 142 CONG. REC. S9987 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
343. Position Paper: Including Gender Protection in ENDA, GENDERPAC (on file with
'author).
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correctly observes that not all lesbians and gay men are
subjected to the same amounts of discrimination and harass-
ment. As evidenced in the cases profiled throughout this article,
those whose gender expressions are less aligned with their
biological sex tend to be more vulnerable to discrimination.
GenderPAC argues that a gay male employee who is taunted
for "feminine" gestures, for example, would have no recourse
under ENDA.344 This is because his employer could defend a
lawsuit by claiming that the discrimination was based on gender
identity and expression discrimination and not sexual
orientation discrimination.3 45
We respectfully disagree with GenderPAC's analysis. The
litigation track record in the eleven states3 46 and scores of
counties and cities 47  that prohibit sexual orientation
employment discrimination is a good indication of what we can
expect once ENDA passes. With very few exceptions, state and
local laws protect against sexual orientation discrimination, but
do not cover gender identity or expression. Under these
statutes, there has been no reported case involving an
While ENDA would offer explicit protection to employees from workplace
discrimination due to their sexual orientation, it offers no such
protection for the way they express their gender.
This approach leaves not only transexual and transgender Americans
at risk, but also gays, lesbians, bisexuals and even straight employees
whose gender expression is visibly different from the norm; for example,
butchy lesbians, effeminate gay men, or straight feminist women
considered "too-masculine."
Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West. Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-
81c (West 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2557 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1997); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2 (Michie Supp. 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West
1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West Supp. 1997); 1997 N.H. Laws 108 (effective Jan.
1, 1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.330 (Michie 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West
1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§11-24-2 to 11-24-2.2, 28-5-3, 28-5-5, 28-5-7 (1995 & Supp. 1996);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1997); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 111.36 (West 1997). All
twelve jurisdictions prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
employment and all but California extend this protection to housing. Minnesota and
Wisconsin also outlaw sexual orientation discrimination in public and private education.
347. Approximately 170 cities have promulgated ordinances that prohibit public and
private employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Some of the larger
cities include New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, Detroit, Dallas,
San Diego, San Francisco, Atlanta, Boston, Phoenix, Denver, Baltimore, Minneapolis, St.
Paul, St. Louis, Kansas City, Portland, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, San Jose, Cleveland, and
Columbus (Ohio). See DENVER, COLO., CITY CODE 28-91 (1990); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,
CODE tit. 7, ch. 139 (1975); PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE tit. 6, ch. 651, § 651.01 art. V (1992). "
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"effeminate" gay man or "butch" lesbian who was barred from
relief because of an employer's successful exercise of a "gender
expression, not sexual orientation" defense.
In addition, such a defense would seem patently pretextual
and, therefore, weak. Discrimination based on effeminacy in a
gay man or masculinity in a lesbian would almost certainly be
"perceived as" sexual orientation discrimination prohibited by
ENDA. It also is unlikely that a defendant would be able to
successfully argue that he discriminated not on the basis of
sexual orientation, but on the basis of gender nonconformity,
without running afoul of Title VII.
As discussed above, some courts automatically conflate
gender nonconformity with sexual orientation and deny Title VII
protection because of that sexual orientation "loophole." For
example, in the cases of Earnest Dillon, Bennie Smith and
Strailey, the courts equated the plaintiffs' perceived effeminacy
with homosexuality and refused relief under Title VII. It is
highly doubtful that those courts would have used that same
"sexual orientation" loophole if ENDA had been in existence at
the time. The "sexual orientation loophole" continues to
disqualify gender nonconforming gay men and women from Title
VII coverage because there is no federal statute prohibiting
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.
ENDA would effectively close the "sexual orientation"
loophole in federal civil rights law, and a defendant-faced with
both Title VII sex stereotyping and ENDA sexual orientation
claims-would have nowhere to hide from liability if the one or
both of the claims proved meritorious.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no shortage of arguments for why and how the
prohibition against discrimination based on sex in Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should apply to anti-gay
discrimination. Because homosexuality violates societal gender
norms, lesbians and gay men face discrimination that almost
always takes the form of sex stereotyping or sexual harassment
based on gender expression. Courts, however, have almost
always treated *the actual or perceived homosexuality of the
plaintiffs as disqualifying them from Title VII relief. Gender
nonconformity standing alone, as in the Price Waterhouse case,
can invoke Title VII relief, but typically not when it is combined
with perceived or actual homosexuality.
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The predominant judicial view of gender nonconformity, and
specifically the scope of Title VII's coverage of sex stereotyping,
is excessively narrow. Fundamentally, discrimination against
lesbians, gay men, bisexual and transgendered people is
discrimination based on gender nonconformity and should be
prohibited under Title VII.
As we have shown, courts have made limited progress
toward adopting an enlightened understanding of the interplay
between sexual orientation and gender expression, and more
importantly, the nexus between sex and gender. They have a
long way to go, however, before gay and transgendered
Americans can rely upon Title VII as recourse for employment
discrimination. Moreover, any relief available under Title VII
now or in the near future most likely would come at the cost to
the plaintiff of "closeting" his/her sexual orientation and settling
for limited relief at best. In sexual harassment claims
especially, gay plaintiffs are required to satisfy high evidentiary
requirements for proving severity and harm, effectively
precluding coverage of many forms of anti-gay discrimination.
Of course, the fact that courts have a long way to go to
accommodate discrimination faced by gay Americans under Title
VII's prohibition against sex discrimination does not mean that
attorneys should not continue to bring test cases to help expand
the scope of the prohibition. Such litigation is important and
should continue. On the other hand, gay Americans cannot
afford to be without a federal statute that explicitly prohibits
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Regardless, and perhaps because of, the slow development of
Title VII to redress some of the discrimination faced by gay
Americans, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act must
become law.
